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In the mid-70’s we are witnessing the election of a growing number of 
activist city and state officials. Many of these new politicians are veterans of the 
social movements of the 1960’s. Others simply reflect the new political aware­
ness surfacing around the country. Both the officials and their policitized com­
munities are evidence of the grass-roots demand for major social and economic 
change.
One of the most interesting examples of this activist local politics has been 
in Berkeley, California. For over six years a number of community groups, 
political activists, and minority communities, have been building a political coali­
tion for the purpose of winning control of the city government. Founded by 
veterans of the civil rights, anti-war and anti-poverty campaigns, the Coalition 
elected Ron Dellums to the City Council in 1967. The Coalition now has three 
of its members on the Council, and another member as the city’s elected auditor. 
Dellums, elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1970, largely through 
Coalition activity, has maintained a close relationship with the organization. 
The Coalition was also instrumental in electing reform advocates Ken Meade to 
the State Assembly and Tom Bates to the Alameda County Board of Supervisors. 
While the group has survived the political changes of the past decade, it still has 
only minority representation on the nine member Berkeley City Council.
The Berkeley Coalition has run its campaigns on the basis of a well- 
developed programmatic platform. Between elections, Coalition members have 
focused on building political support for these programs, which include: city 
ownership of the private electric utility, progressive local taxes, more decision­
making power for neighborhoods, rent control, and city or cooperative-owned 
banks.
The Community Ownership Organizing Project, author of this study, has 
worked with the coalition in the development of these alternative programs. 
COOP is committed to a policy for the reallocation of cities’ wealth. They are 
concerned to find those economic and political policies which will lead to the 
redistribution of city resources from the wealthy, who have traditionally bene­
fited from municipal policy, to those members of the community who have 
received little from city government in the past. The COOP group sees city 
government as a vehicle for implementing progressive programs which will 
promote basic change.
In The Cites’ Wealth: Programs for Community Economic Control in 
Berkeley, COOP outlines the history and character of political activity in Berke­
ley. The book describes the specific alternative programs that coalition candi­
dates have supported, as well as other programs and approaches which have been 
considered by Berkeley candidates and activists. In a sense, it is a programmatic 
handbook that should prove very useful for activist officials, coalitions, and 
community groups who are struggling to redistribute the benefits of their own 
cities’ resources. The Community Ownership Organizing Project and the National 
Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies would appreciate 
comments and criticisms from activists throughout the country.
Lee Webb, Director 
National Conference on 
Alternative State and Local Public Policies
Ramparts Magazine
Richard Barnes Michael Hill
Nacio Jan Brown
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2nd 
EDITION
Political change conies slowly, even in Berkeley. The second edition of 
THE CITIES’ WEALTH marks ten years of Coalition politics in the city-a 
movement of radicals, minorities, students and liberal Democrats working to­
gether for popular control of the local economy.
The Coalition’s organization, Berkeley Citizen’s Action, made substantial 
gains in the November election. Congressman Ron Dellums won re-election by a 
wide margin to a fourth term, and BCA-supported candidates Tom Bates and 
John George won seats to the California State Assembly and the Alameda 
County Board of Supervisors respectively. George will become the first Black 
supervisor in the county’s history.
The local press has begun talk of a “Dellums machine” in the East Bay, 
despite the lack of opportunist dealing, pay-offs, and personality campaigns that 
mark traditional machine politics. The “machine” is in fact a movement, a 
coalition of people committed to clear programs that meet the needs of poor 
and working people in the community.
There are surely enough small defeats and frustrations to keep this politi­
cal movement humble. Once again a major initiative victory that would permit 
popular control of the city’s controversial industrial park was struck down by 
the courts. Court cases have also weakened the statewide Campaign Reform Act 
and the local campaign reform ordinance that was modeled after it. The petty 
hostility of the city council majority toward any position taken by the progres­
sive members continues to poison the atmosphere of council meetings.
But the three BCA councilmembers and the elected city auditor have 
learned how to wield the power of a determined minority. In 1976, their strong 
opposition to two regressive taxes proposed by the City Manager made it 
politically impossible for the majority to support them. The auditor has built a 
picture window into the city bureaucracy, revealing much to the community 
about hiring policies, inefficiency,' and the city budget.
Already BCA is organizing for the campaign of spring, 1977, with a mix of 
initiative measures and candidates for office. After four years of legal delay, the 
California Supreme Court finally affirmed the right of cities to enact rent 
control legislation by initiative. The Berkeley Tenants Organizing Committee is 
drafting a new ordinance that fits the court’s guidelines, and plans to place it on 
the April ballot. Once again, a sweep of BCA candidates would bring the 
Coalition majority control of the council, and the ability to  enact many of the 
programs in this book. Hopes for popular control of the city rise again each 
spring. After all, it’s only been ten years.
November, 1976
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I. KEYS TO THE CITY
The Gties ’ Wealth: Programs fo r Community Economic Control in Berkeley, 
California is a collection of ideas and programs, a compendium of things past 
and an always unfinished work-in-progress. It is the product of radical political 
activity in Berkeley dating from the late 1960s. The programs are concrete, 
policy-oriented, and for the most part grounded in experience. We have com­
piled this paper with the intention of sharing the Berkeley experience as widely 
and usefully as possible.
The premise of those who contributed these programs is that the wealth of 
a city, and the potential political power of city government, can be made to 
serve the needs of ordinary citizens. The emphasis of many of the programs 
described is the redistribution of city resources from the wealthy who tradi­
tionally benefit from city policy to those members of the community who have 
received little from city government in the past.
The G ties’ Wealth focuses on the techniques of economic and political 
policy which lead toward controlling and reallocating a city’s wealth. Many of 
the techniques discussed in the paper gre common and easily grasped. Others, 
particularly in the area of economic policy, are often mystified by technicians 
and experts. We have attempted to simplify those policies so that they can be 
put to work by people in the community.
The tactics we have outlined are intended to be examples of structural, or 
non-reformist reform, extending the actual or potential realm of people’s power. 
We have tried to avoid including techniques for conventional political shifts, 
where one group with similar goals nudges out another for positions at the top, 
but the structure remains intact.
A. Goals
Although it is difficult to generalize about the values of Berkeley’s left 
community, certain themes and loyalties have been consistent through the 
years. The first and most basic is identification with the city’s poor, ethnic 
minorities, students, youth and working people. However, in a ‘liberal” univer­
sity town with a large white-collar and student population and only light indus­
try, class identifications are often confused. As a result, Berkeley’s radical poli­
tical coalitions have sought to accommodate a wide range of supporters with 
similar populist and socialist goals.
Commitment to egalitarian ideals has meant efforts to improve the eco­
nomic position of the city’s many renters and small homeowners. That commit­
ment has also been translated into support for free social services to the under­
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served poor, the transient, the young, the disabled and the elderly. It has meant 
support for affirmative action programs for ethnic minorities and women, and 
other programs to rectify past injustices. Finally, it has meant concern with a 
long list of environmental problems, from industrial pollution to waste recycling.
B. Strategy
While it is obvious that cities are severely limited in how much they can 
effect wider public policy, cities also offer unique opportunities for promoting 
basic change. First and foremost, cities are legitimate political entities that have 
the power to tax, own property, annex territory, borrow capital at reduced 
rates, and own and operate productive enterprises. Those are not insignificant 
abilities. Cities are also immediately accountable to the organized pressure of 
their residents. They have the potential to be controlled democratically. These 
two aspects of city government—legitimate political authority and democratic 
control—make them an ideal vehicle for implementing progressive programs.
C. The Community
Contrary to popular myths, Berkeley shares many characteristics with 
other small American cities. Residents tend to have incomes either significantly 
higher or lower than the city’s average, with disproportionately few in the 
middle range. The local population of 120,000 is about 60 percent White, 
25 percent Black, 10 percent Asian, and 5 percent Latino. From 12-15 percent 
of the city’s work force is officially unemployed; almost 20 percent of the 
households are receiving public assistance. The median income is below that of 
the rest of the San Francisco Bay Area.
But the city is not poor. While a typical city of its size would be expected 
to generate $500 to $750 million of income per year, Berkeley generates more 
than $1 billion a year. A major university is located in the city, as well as an 
unusually large number of financial institutions, service industries and an assort­
ment of manufacturing companies that attract more commuters than the total 
number of workers in the city’s resident labor force.
City government in Berkeley, as elsewhere, has not affected transfers of 
wealth and power to relieve the disparities between the large amount of income 
produced in the local economy and the low incomes of many city households. 
Public revenue comes from regressive taxes; the city bureaucracies are overblown 
and under-productiye ; real estate speculation has put decent housing beyond the 
reach of most of the city’s lower and middle income people. Political power in 
the city has long been dominated by the business and professional communities.
2
D. A Brief Chronology
The progressive political activity in Berkeley of the 1970s has its im­
mediate roots in the political movements of the 1960s. The issues of civil rights 
and opposition to the Viet Nam war produced the university-based Free Speech 
Movement, the Scheer for Congress campaign, and eventually resulted in a new 
coalition of students, ethnic minorities and some of the city’s liberal Democrats 
that attempted to gain representation on the city council in 1967. Ron Dellums, 
endorsed by this coalition, was elected to the council, providing both leadership 
and access to legitimacy for the developing progressive constituency. Elected 
Berkeley’s congressman in 1970, he has continued to influence the entire decade 
of coalition politics in the city.
By 1971, the Berkeley Coalition had become the April Coalition, named 
for the spring city council elections. The Coalition put forward a slate of candi­
dates committed to a platform formulated in open community meetings. It 
stressed programs rather than personalities during the campaign. The slate tac­
tic also allowed the Coalition to exploit a temporary split between traditional 
Democrats and Republicans in Berkeley. Three of the four Coalition candidates 
were elected—Ilona Hancock, a woman with strong support in the student and 
flatland communities, and Black attorneys D’Army Bailey and Ira Simmons.
With the establishment of a Hancock community office, progressive, politi­
cally active Berkeley citizens involved themselves in day-to-day city affairs. Com­
munity “experts” on a wide range of issues emerged from everywhere; mono­
maniacs crept out of the woodwork; amateurs learned to analyze city programs. 
A volunteer staff developed that researched issues, hounded local bureaucrats, 
developed information networks, and orchestrated public hearings.
The city council became a forum where Loni Hancock, D’Army Bailey and 
Ira Simmons could ask the community’s embarrassing questions publicly. Other 
councilmembers could no longer discreetly negotiate all differences in the back 
room. They were furious. They considered it indecent to be forced to vote pub­
licly on motions that had no chance of passing but revealed much about their 
allegiance to business interests.
High level city bureaucrats were similarly enraged that their judgment was 
questioned so publicly and thoroughly. Prior to 1971 they had not even sub­
mitted budget documentation to the council. The city manager had grown accus­
tomed to having a free hand.
The excitement of winning the election soon gave way to the somber reali­
zation of the limitations of a minority voice. Progressive programs rarely were 
enacted. As differences in perspective between the three April Coalition council- 
members deepened, Hancock frequently found herself unable to have issues even 
discussed for lack of a second to her motions.
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The split between Hancock and Black councilmembers Bailey and 
Simmons began to appear shortly after the election and widened with time. 
While Bailey and Simmons maintained their commitment to programs benefiting 
the Black poor, their resistance to feminist programs emerged in especially 
strong contrast to the constituency that elected them. Mistrust between racial 
groups in Berkeley prevented a working through of the differences.
Meanwhile, the struggle to gain control over the city council continued. 
Despite the internal divisions, the election of three Coalition candidates in 1971 
apparently was taken very seriously by the business community. Bay Area and na­
tional corporations contributed $76,000 in 1973 to four “liberal” candidates op­
posing the Coalition slate, andin the same election contributed $100,000 to defeat 
a public power initiative. Despite this unprecendented deluge of outside money, 
April Coalition candidate Ying Lee Kelley was elected.
The new strength quickly enabled Coalition councilmembers to raise and 
second important policy questions that the majority wished to avoid. In re­
sponse, the council majority reduced the number of meetings per month by half, 
holding instead very long meetings that routinely extended into the early morn­
ing hours. The exhausted but determined majority conducted much of the city’s 
business before empty council chambers.
Using Bailey’s disruptive council tactics as an excuse, the business com­
munity led a carefully-timed recall campaign against him in the summer of 
1973. With the progressive and even minority communities split over his perfor­
mance and the students out of town, the recall was successful.
Subsequent elections have seen the emergence of a gentlemen’s agreement 
among the business and professional leaders of the city. Republicans do not run 
for political office. Democratic corporate liberals run an opposing slate to the 
Coalition candidates, mirroring the Coalition’s representation of Blacks, Asians, 
women and students. The tactic has effectively held Coalition candidates to a 
minority of the nine-member city council.
The 1975 election provided some reassurance that voters leam to support 
candidates whose programs will benefit them. Loni Hancock, up for re-election, 
came in first among all council candidates. Her support in the low-income and 
ethnic minority precincts was strong.
Ying Lee Kelley, whose council term was unexpired, ran for mayor against 
the corporate liberal Black incumbent. His re-election was considered a cer­
tainty, yet Kelley won 47 percent of the votes. Her support came overwhelm­
ingly from the campus area and integrated fiatland neighborhoods. The mayor 
won large majorities in the white affluent precincts and in the Black neighbor­
hoods of the city.
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The April Coalition, renamed Berkeley Citizen’s Action in 1975, now holds 
three council seats. Kelley remains on the council, along with Hancock and John 
Denton, one of the two other electoral victories for BCA in the spring. In a little 
noticed but extremely important victory, Coalition candidate Florence 
McDonald was elected as city auditor. She will have access to  information that 
has long been of interest to the community but remained hidden in City Hall. 
Finally, Coalition support in the fall of 1974 helped re-elect Congressman 
Ron Dellums and State Assemblymen Ken Meade and John J. Miller, all of 
whom work for strong progressive measures in representing Berkeley residents.
The Berkeley Citizen’s Action councilmembers and the city auditor still 
have a minority voice in city politics, but it is louder than ever. They have gained 
a more secure platform from which to expose the values and allegiances of the 
council majority, and to present realistic alternatives to its programs. Hopefully 
this will soon lead to progressive control of the city government.
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H. POLITICAL POWER AND 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: 
CONSOLIDATING THE GAINS
The history of progressive, populist, radical and socialist movements in 
American cities is replete with short term gains. Neighborhoods, working-class and 
poor people, and middle-class reformers have often organized and mobilized 
around specific issues and specific elections, and have won a wide variety of vic­
tories on the local level. All too often, however, those movements have foundered 
because of an inability to maintain a majority in power at the city level.
This section addresses the problem of maintaining a political movement 
and consolidating political gains before having majority political power in the 
city. That is, how can power bases be developed and what kind of policies and 
techniques can be proposed which will help sustain a progressive political move­
ment, give it leverage, and help it grow towards a^potential majority?
The issue here is not how to organize—local circumstances vary widely, and 
political organizers have their own assessments of their own communities. We will 
describe specific Berkeley programs which have been enacted to increase partici­
pation and expand political bases.
Increased citizen participation in the processes and institutions of city gov- 
vemment has often provided an effective counterweight to traditional centers of 
influence and power in Berkeley. Citizen involvement at public hearings, meet­
ings of advisory boards, and council meetings often helps expose the positions of 
those with power, clarifying and in some cases intensifying the conflicts that exist.
However, the forces that mitigate against greater participation are quite 
powerful. The intricacy and glacial pace of city government makes people feel 
their involvement in it would be pointless. Consequently, the Berkeley programs 
encourage such .processes as initiative campaigns, where direct results can be 
achieved and citizens can move into positions where they have a certain degree 
of power.
The development of legitimacy and position for those who raise questions 
of redistribution of city resources is an important intermediate step towards gain­
ing majority power. It enables citizens to develop broad support for policies 
which challenge the status quo.




Election reform is a means of improving the odds for progressive forces in 
electoral campaigns-not a substitute for concrete organizing. But while cam­
paign spending limitations and publication of funding sources do not accomplish 
structural reform, they are important steps in challenging the business and pro­
fessional community that often controls the financing of local campaigns.
The April Coalition’s early history showed the necessity of election reform 
in Berkeley. The Coalition discovered in 1973 that even the possibility of pro­
gressives taking the reins of city government attracted large sums of money to 
the opposition from the corporate power structure of the Bay Area and much of 
California. Companies contributing to the moderate “Berkeley Four” included 
Standard Oil of California, Sante Fe Railroad, Southern Pacific Land Company, 
Wells Fargo Bank, the Bechtel Corporation, and Del Monte. The Coalition was 
outspent that year by a margin of five to one by its corporate liberal opposition. 
In the same election, supporters of the initiative for public ownership of the 
electric power company were outspent thirty to one by Pacific Gas and Electric 
and its corporate friends. While the Coalition understood that no guaranteed re­
sults would flow from election reform, it used the initiative process to place a 
reform measure on the ballot in 1974.
Sensing broad support for campaign reform in Berkeley, the council 
majority followed suit with an almost identical initiative. Both measures were 
passed by the voters. Since the council majority’s measure received the greater 
number of votes, it alone was enacted.
The election reform measure1 has two parts, one dealing with candidates 
and one with initiatives. It includes the following provisions:
-  candidate spending limitation of $10,000 or 14^ per registered voter 
(whichever is less), with an inflation factor and deductions for incumbents and 
electoral slates;
-  a limitation of $7,500 or 10^ per registered voter on contributions for 
initiative campaigns;
-  prohibition on corporate contributions;
-  limitations on how much an individual can give ($250);
-  a fair campaign practices commission to adjudicate complaints;
-  public disclosure of all contributions of $25 or more.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company appealed the law just prior to the cam­
paign for public power in 1974. A local judge suspended the limitations on ini­
tiative campaigns because PG&E’s corporate property was “threatened” by the
8
coming election. The reform law as it relates to candidates remains as enacted by 
the voters.
The effect of the law was to narrow the ratio of expenditures between cor­
porate liberal and progressive candidates from five to one down to two to one, 
and in the public power initiative from thirty to one down to ten to one, even 
though PG&E was not technically bound by the reform law.
Money, however, is not the only issue in election reform. Spending limita­
tions can also mean increased public mobilization for electoral campaigns. When 
voters feel they will not be outspent by huge contributions that can buy media 
time and campaign staff, they have a stronger impetus for participating. The 
battle becomes one of people against people, and the potential for community 
involvement is thereby increased.
One word of fair warning: election reform may favor those people who are 
known in the community for their work, but it also tends to favor any 
incumbent.
B. Use of the Initiative
The initiative process is particularly strong in California as a result of Pro­
gressive reforms in the state early in the century. The April Coalition has relied 
heavily on initiative campaigns to supplement the minority voice it has on the 
city council. Progressive initiative ordinances passed in Berkeley in recent years 
have overturned the utility user tax,2 approved rent control, established a police 
review commission, required council approval of police treaties, and called for 
master plan revision, neighborhood preservation, legalization of marijuana,3 elec­
tion campaign reform, and representation for all councilmembers on city boards 
and commissions.
In several recent cases, however, the elation of a successful initiative cam­
paign was soon replaced by bitter lessons in power politics. For example, a local 
judge invalidated the rent control ordinance. He reasoned that since there are 
more renters than landlords in the city, the result of a rent control initiative was 
a foregone conclusion and thus denied landlords equal protection under the law. 
The decision is now on appeal before the California Superior Court on other 
issues.
The people of Berkeley learned a similar political lesson when campaign 
spending limitations were suspended for Pacific Gas and Electric Company dur­
ing the second public power initiative campaign in 1974.
Use of the initiative or referendum has also been somewhat limited with 
regard to taxes. It is legally possible to remove a tax by referendum, but the law 
is not so clear with regard to levying a tax or mandating specific program expen­
ditures by initiative.
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The initiative process has been extremely valuable in clarifying the posi­
tions of opposing candidates during council elections, particularly in the 1973 
campaign when public power, neighborhood preservation and police control 
initiatives were on the ballot. Although the corporate liberal candidates often 
tried to confuse issues during the campaign, their opposition to initiative mea­
sures exposed their true political stance.
Because an initiative campaign is such a laborious method for passing city 
ordinances, past campaigns in Berkeley have focused too narrowly on the collec­
tion of petition signatures. Pressure to collect many signatures in a short time 
discourages solicitation drives among people who might be initially less favorable 
to the measure. Ignoring these residents, however, can prove self-defeating, lead­
ing to electoral loss in neighborhoods not first canvassed for signatures and early 
educational work.
Realizing these problems, the Coalition placed a successful charter amend­
ment4 on the ballot in 1974 which reduced the required number of signatures 
needed to place an initiative on the ballot in a statewide election from 15 per­
cent to 10 percent. General municipal elections require signatures of only 5 per­
cent of the electorate to place an initiative on the ballot.
C. Charter Revision
The Charter Review Committee5 was appointed by the city council in 
1974, mandated to examine the existing city charter from top to bottom and 
make recommendations to the council. It was a relatively large commission with 
an authorized strength of 56 members, many of whom anticipated making sub­
stantial changes in city government.
The charter review process provided an opportunity to raise fundamental 
questions about the structure of local politics, opening up the whole matter of 
how the mechanisms of government work. If members of the Committee had 
been able to follow through, the process would have permitted the issues of city 
manager form of government, district representation and town hall or parlia­
mentary government to be seriously considered by the electorate. Appointees of 
the present council majority, however, successfully prevented any substantive 
issues from reaching the community.
Coalition forces within the Charter Review Committee formed a sub-group 
called “Charter Action.” It attempted to involved the broader community in the 
review process.
Charter Action and the full Committee discussed the following possible 
changes in the present council-manager form of local government.
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1. Power decentralization
Following the tenure of Socialist mayor J. Stitt Wilson in 1913, Berkeley’s 
business and professional interests began a campaign for the city manager form 
of government that culminated in the City Charter of 1923. For the next 50 
years, the city manager held sole power to hire and fire employees, as well as 
major responsibility for city revenues and expenditures. Prior to 1971, the city 
manager presented the annual budget to the council for only cursory inspection 
and approval. The city manager is easily the most powerful office in city govern­
ment, and has traditionally been filled by a high-salaried professional who is 
comfortable in business circles.
In recent years the Coalition has tried to reduce the power of the city 
manager through three successive versions of a reform measure. The council 
majority refused to place the first and strongest version on the June, 1974 state­
wide election ballot. The second version was defeated by the voters in 
November, 1974, and the third passed in April, 1975.6 The successful measure 
changed the number of council votes needed to fire the city manager from six to 
five, and stipulated that the council—not the city manager—had final authority 
on selection of city department heads. The council is now able to set a proba­
tionary period for both the city manager and new department heads, after which 
a five-vote majority must re-approve the council selections.
2. District elections
The concept of mini-districting developed from an analysis of the history 
of the at-large elections for the Berkeley city council. With the shift to at-large 
elections after 1923 came a major trend toward representation by businessmen 
and professionals from the wealthier sections of the city. The poor, working 
people, students and women were effectively kept out of office because of the 
financial and time resources necessary to serve on the council.
The mini-district concept relies on more community involvement in city 
government than presently exists. One councilmember would be elected from 
each of 29 mini-districts with equal populations of about 4,000. Six representa­
tives would still be elected at-large for a city council of 35 members. Proponents 
believe the council would not be unwieldy: Madison, Wisconsin has had 22 dis­
trict representatives for nearly 40 years.
The mini-district concept would be compatible with strong neighborhood 
organizations that gain increased power under the system.
3. Neighborhood councils
Members of Charter Action proposed a system of neighborhood councils 
to encourage the level of citizen participation in government and augment the
11
mini-district concept. The councils would be involved in city budgeting, policy, 
personnel and administration as they affect the neighborhoods. Neighborhood 
council representation on city boards and commissions would also be substantial, 
possibly as much as half of the members, to further encourage participation in 
the neighborhood structure.
4.Proportional representation
This system of local government would provide the greatest strength for 
minority viewpoints, and so is particularly attractive to the progressive Coalition. 
Any group able to attract one-ninth of the votes (assuming the present nine- 
member council) would have a representative on the council.
Appointees of the present city council majority saw to it that most of these 
proposals got no further than the Committee meeting room. But the Charter Re­
view Committee produced excellent research on the political history of the city, 
some of which was published in a local newspaper. If Charter Review served no 
other purpose, it reopened discussion about ward or district local government.
D. Neighborhood Control
Neighborhood control and participation is often a slogan without content. 
While mobilization of people around neighborhood issues is both an important 
means of involvement and to a certain extent a democratic end in itself, there 
are some difficult issues involved. Neighborhood control has often meant exclu­
sivity for wealthy neighborhoods. It is unclear which issues are strictly neighbor­
hood ones, and which are truly city-wide.
Neighborhood control in Berkeley has been defined by the Coalition to 
mean extending the traditional limited sovereignty of wealthy neighborhoods to 
lower income districts, and attempting to strip all neighborhoods of the power 
to exclude low income and ethnic minority residents. Without adequate repre­
sentation on the city council, however, lower income neighborhoods still face 
the problem of enforcing their demands for power.
Presently, the Savo Island neighborhood has made a unique “double-green 
light” agreement7 with the city and Redevelopment Agency concerning land use 
and development in its area. The agreement is contractual, signed by the repre­
sentatives of the Redevelopment Agency and the community group. It stipulates 
that both parties must agree on decisions concerning redevelopment plans, con­
sultants, construction contracts, financing, and administration of the newly- 
developed projects. Any disagreement must be worked out in negotiations, and 
both groups must approve before a decision is completed. The agreement has al­
lowed the neighborhood to take a substantial amount of initiative in promoting 
the type of development it wants—low to moderate income cooperative housing.
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The North Berkeley neighborhood is negotiating for a similar agreement 
concerning vacant land in its area. There are proposals being developed for an 
initiative to extend this power to other neighborhoods as well.
Representatives of the community must be clearly designated for the 
“double-green light” agreement to work. The Savo Island neighborhood held 
elections, but had a functioning community organization before the need arose 
for formal neighborhood elections. The making of similar neighborhood con­
tracts depends to a certain extent on the good will of the city—there is very little 
that will force the city into such an agreement, aside from strong community 
pressure. In the case of Savo Island, the Redevelopment Agency felt it was in its 
best interests to negotiate a settlement with the community.
The “double-green light” agreement suggests the possibility of collective 
bargaining agreements between the various neighborhoods and the city on speci­
fied issues. These issues would likely involve land use, code enforcement, housing 
rehabilitation programs, traffic and transportation, community services and new 
development. The collective bargaining agreement would specify the means by 
which decisions would be made and implemented.
A significant and sweeping proposal widely discussed in Berkeley is the 
delegation to the neighborhoods of both program funds and the responsiblity for 
their allocation. Certain percentages of the city budget or of revenue sharing 
money could be given to local community councils, which would decide how the 
money should be spent.
One of the main problems here is the extent to which people actually par­
ticipate in neighborhood affairs. The history of neighborhood participation in 
Berkeley has often followed a pattem of significant enthusiasm around an issue 
in the initial phase, followed by rapid disinterest and often negligible results. In 
order for neighborhood participation to have meaning, the neighborhoods must 
feel that their participation will have an actual effect on city actions.
The question of neighborhood exclusivity and the redistribution of neigh­
borhood resources to lower income neighborhoods must be dealt with by city­
wide policy. For example, city-wide policy can be established that attempts to 
equalize the construction of new low-income units throughout the city’s neigh­
borhoods, or that sets priorities for park development to those areas needing it 
most. If money is disbursed to community councils, it should clearly go first to 
neighborhoods in need—possibly following a formula inversely proportional to 
neighborhood income.
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E. Fair Representation Ordinance
Volunteer staff members of the Hancock and Kelley offices wrote, circu­
lated, and successfully campaigned for an ordinance that requires boards and 
commissions to be comprised of appointees of each councilmember, one or two 
appointments per councilmember depending on the commission size. The 
measure thus insures that city boards and commissions will reflect the same poli­
tical spectrum as the city council. Before passage of this ordinance, an appoint­
ments committee controlled by the majority refused to  appoint any candidates 
recommended by Hancock and Kelley. Hie problem is a chronic one for political 
minorities in the city.
The Fair Representation Ordinance8 allows the gains achieved in city elec- 
; tions to be more widely institutionalized. Members of boards and commissions 
have the aegis of prestige, honor and official status o f elected officials, which can 
be a tremendous advantage if they are actively involved with community organi­
zations. The burden on councilmembers to be perpetually available authorities 
on every subject can also be reduced.
To the extent that some of the boards and commissions wield considerable 
power (the Planning Commission, the Board of Adjustments and recently the 
Recreation Commission), councilmembets have the opportunity to delegate con­
crete authority to groups within their constituency that have not been able to 
win a council seat. For example, in the past two elections the Coalition’s Black 
candidates have been defeated at the polls. The councilmembers have been able 
to appoint Black and other Third World constituents to the important boards 
and commissions.
Hancock, Kelley and Denton worked directly with Berkeley Citizen’s Action to 
supply candidates for the boards and commissions. This process has several im­
portant benefits. BCA established a policy of recommending SO percent Third 
World commissioners, selected by a Third World Caucus. Collective evaluation of 
the candidates favors better selections, and the BCA organization itself is made 
stronger through its ability to nominate commissioners. Finally, having three 
commissioners with similar politics on every board gives BCA councilmembers a 
strong minority position on each one that can often sway the less unifed majority.
F. Community Control of Police
Community efforts to control the city police force have been only partial­
ly successful. In 1971, a comprehensive initiative measure9 that would have de­
centralized the police department was prepared and circulated by the Intercom­
munal Committee to Combat Fascism, an inter-racial political group associated 
with the Black Panther Party.
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The proposal called for direct control of the police by locally elected 
councils in three districts—the Black community, the student area, and the Ber­
keley hills—and required officers to live in the community they served.
The principles behind this amendment to the city charter included the crea­
tion of new centers of popular power, decentralization of government decision­
making, and a reduction of the power of state and federal police agencies within 
the community. The measure offered a class and racial perspective on the police 
that fundamentally differed from typical liberal reforms.
The political impetus for the measures grew out of the period of the late 
1960s when there was substantial conflict and hostility between the Berkeley 
police and the student, counter-culture, and Black communities. The twin issues 
of police brutality and adequate police protection for minority communities 
generated the movement for community control.
During this period the Berkeley Police Department was considered to be 
one of the most “professional” in the country. It worked closely with the FBI 
and other federal agencies.
The campaign for community control of the police was one of the most 
polarizing in the city’s history, with outspoken opposition coming from the 
university, business and real estate interests, and the conservative daily newspa­
per. Despite the heavy financing of opponents, over 16,000 persons, or approxi­
mately one-third of the voters, supported the initiative.
Strongest support came from the student and counter-culture communities, 
where the proposal won by a small margin. In the affluent hill section of the city, 
the initiative lost by nearly five to one, and in predominantly Black West Berkeley 
it also was defeated by more than three to one. The campaign for community 
control of police suffered because of the traditional distrust of “White radicals” 
in the Black community, despite the fact that the proposal itself originated with 
the Black Panther Party.
Although community control of police failed, the city-wide discussion of 
police problems and need for change that the measure stimulated contributed to 
subsequent passage of two police reform initiatives in 1973.
The Police Review Commission10, consisting of nine members appointed 
by the council, was established by one of the initiatives. The Commission was to 
have access to police records to check citizen complaints. Members were author­
ized to cross-examine witnesses to make recommendations for needed legislation. 
Although a majority of its members were appointed by the moderate council 
majority, the Police Review Commission posed a serious challenge to police de­
partment power in the city.
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The department reacted immediately to shut off access to police records. 
Police officers went to court opposing the Commission’s right to cross-examine 
them. To date not a single police officer has testified before the Commission. 
Commissioners and their investigators do, however, discuss police policy with 
the Chief of Police. While the Commission has been stymied on individual com­
plaints about officers, it has been an effective citizen’s lobby on police practices. 
The Commission has successfully vetoed department plans to  use police dogs on 
patrol in the city, and to form a special weapons team for use in assault and 
paramilitary operations.
The second successful community control of police initiative concerned 
the secret treaties and agreements that the police department had with other law 
enforcement and military agencies. These were called “mutual aid pacts.” The 
long standing agreements came to the attention of the Berkeley electorate when
they were activated to repress the demonstrations of the late 1960’s. The 
iniative 1 1 required that all such agreements be individually evaluated by the city
council. In fact this was not carried out. Despite recommendations and research 
by the Police Review Commission, the agreements were all approved as a block 
(with one exception) by the council majority on the last possible day under the 
ordinance. Police treaties and agreements remain a basically undisrupted and 
unmonitored power of the police department.
Two other police control initiatives that failed in 1973 would have required 
city council approval of police weapons,12 and required officers to be city resi­
dents.13 Each was defeated by a margin of only 2 to 3 percent of the votes.
The Weapons Control Initiative was stimulated by requests of the depart­
ment to purchase and use the latest military equipment developed against demon­
strators, including pepper foggers, helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and 
submachine guns. The campaign for this initiative became confused and finally 
faltered because the ordinance included restrictions in the police use of handguns.
G. Use of the City Auditor’s Office
Berkeley is the only city in California with an elected auditor. The auditor 
must sign all checks, and as a result has access to full information on city con­
tracts and spending. Florence McDonald, the successful BCA candidate in 1975, 
has publicized where the city spends its money, and precisely what benefits 
result from each department’s expenditures.
The auditor’s office can also be a place for access to information that will 
aid citizen monitoring of the budget-making process. An Auditor’s Advisory 
Committee of local residents has worked with McDonald from the time of her 
nomination.
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Encouraging and consolidating citizen participation in local goverment is 
only the beginning of community economic control. It provides the votes and 
the institutional power to enact legislation and enforce redistributive measures. 
Clearly, citizen participation is not simply intended as therapy for people frus­
trated with modem bureaucratic control. It is a means to power for the many, 




Il [. REAL ESTATE AND 
HOUSING
Radical groups in Berkeley have long emphasized housing programs as key 
to controlling the city’s wealth. There are a number of sound strategic reasons 
for this. By far the largest portion of the city’s private land is used for housing. 
A substantial part of all personal income is spent on housing. Within the urban 
economy, the accruing capital of the community tends to be concentrated in the 
increasing values of land and real estate. Finally, housing can be controlled far 
more easily than other forms of wealth which are moveable and beyond the 
scope of legal regulation by the city.
But by far the most compelling reason for community housing programs is 
the abject failure of the private housing market to provide adequate shelter for 
the great majority of people. Increased financing rates, developer profits, and 
spiraling land and material costs have awakened most Americans from the dream 
of a ranch-style house on a quarter acre lot in the suburbs. Less than 15 percent 
of the nation’s families can now afford a new home.
As a result, great numbers of urban dwellers are condemned to permanent 
tenancy. Even rental space has become expensive and difficult to find, especially 
in popular areas such as the San Francisco Bay region.
Housing patterns in Berkeley in recent years have been marked by a severe 
shortage of rental housing accompaniedby large rent increases. Over three-fourths 
of Berkeley’s renters earning less than $10,000 per year and almost all of those 
earning less than $6,000 per year paid more than 25 percent of income for rent 
in 1970. Housing costs have increased dramatically since then.
The squeeze in rental housing is paralleled by increases in owner-occupied 
home prices, resulting in middle income White families moving into formerly 
lower-income Black areas. These patterns may result in a serious alteration in the 
social and economic characteristics of Berkeley as poorer people are forced to 
live in neighboring cities.
Community ownership of housing and real estate is the ultimate goal of 
Coalition housing programs. That goal has been approached through tenant 
unions, rent control, a neighborhood preservation ordinance, rehabilitation and 
code enforcement programs, and cooperative ownership conversion. Each of 
these reforms is intended as an interim step towards cooperative and community- 
owned housing by limiting property speculation and thus deflating or partially 
expropriating income property values. Each will be discussed in turn as progres­
sions in a strategy for community control and ownership of housing.
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A. Tenant Unions
Berkeley’s tenant union movement began in the late 1960s, paralleling the 
rise in local real estate speculation and the resulting sharp increases in rents. In 
1969-70, the Berkeley Tenants’ Union (BTU) and TORCH organized a city-wide 
rent strike affecting dozens of local buildings. BTU No. 7 managed 25 apart­
ments under a three-year contract signed in 1970 at the height of tenant mili­
tancy in the city. Negotiations for contract renewal broke down in 1973 over 
the issue of housing repairs, leading to an 18-month strike against one of the 
most notorious landlords in Berkeley. The BTU ultimately lost in court but 
maintains ownership control of one-third of their apartments.
The BTU and the Berkeley Tenant’s Organizing Committee (BTOC) were 
among the most active supporters of the successful rent control initiative, passed 
in 1973. Although rent control was eventually overturned in the local courts, 
passage of the initiative was one of the most important organizing victories of 
the Coalition, involving great numbers of Berkeley residents in a clear issue of 
economic control. Years of militant tenant organizing proved critical to the suc­
cess of recent city-enacted code enforcement and housing rehabilitation programs.
The combined efforts of the Berkeley Board of Realtors and the California 
Real Estate Association have stifled the tenant organizing of the past. But 
tenant unions remain an important weapon in forcing landlords to make conces­
sions that will ultimately lead to resident control and community ownership 
of housing.
B. Rent Control
Since 1969, rent control has been adopted by over a hundred New Jersey 
municipalities, Boston and four other Massachusetts cities, Washington, D.C., 
and several Alaskan communities.
Rent control is a conventional way of restricting abnormal market in­
creases in rent and providing some protection to tenants. Its reputation has been 
hurt by the association of New York City’s rent control with deterioration and 
abandonment of existing housing. However, there has been no clear evidence 
proving the relationship between rent control and ills attributed to it. A recent 
study of rent control commissioned by the Massachusetts state legislature indi­
cates that rent control has not caused a decrease in new construction or main­
tenance. Rent control laws enacted within the last six years generally allow for 
periodic increases in rent, exempt the initial setting of rent for new construction, 
and tie rent increases to building maintenance. They move in the direction of 
community control of housing, but do not achieve it.
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The Berkeley rent control charter amendment,14 enacted in 1972, is 
unique in that it was passed by initiative and provides for an elected board. As 
previously mentioned the law has been tied up in litigation for the past three 
years. The courts have indicated, however, that California city councils do have 
the power to adopt rent control.
In a community like Berkeley, where two-thirds of the residents are 
tenants, rent control could provide important protection from the effects of the 
city’s chronic housing shortage. It would protect the individual tenant from sky­
rocketing rents and protect the community from severe population restructuring 
as poorer residents are forced out entirely.
A rent control ordinance should include provisions which allow the sys­
tem to function in a flexible manner, such as provision of an appeals board em­
powered to examine records and make decisions on individual cases. Eviction 
controls which many feel are a necessary part of a successful rent control scheme 
are preempted by California state law.
By enacting rent control and thereby restricting increases in future rents, a 
city may actually reduce the present value of a property. This is essentially com­
munity expropriation in favor of tenants. Judicial review of rent control ordi­
nances has upheld this power of the city.
Stringent rent control in Berkeley’s speculative real estate market would 
greatly cut the value of rental property. Since other private owners would be 
unlikely to buy the property in such an unfavorable climate, the city could pur­
chase the property at below market prices or aid tenants in converting the pro­
perty to cooperative ownership. If rent control were part of a coordinated pro­
gram that includes a shift away from property taxes, this policy would not cut 
city tax revenues.
Rent control ordinances are frequently extremely complicated. They are 
eloquent testimony on how much more difficult it is to control the excesses of 
speculation and the private market than to directly control housing conditions 
through community or cooperative ownership.
If local rent control ordinances apply to commercial property as well, elec­
toral allies can be developed from among small business people. In Berkeley 
almost all small business operators are renters. They are often subject to higher 
rental increases than residential tenants.
C. Neighborhood Control of Land Use
The Neighborhood Preservation Ordinance,15 approved by 60 percent of 
Berkeley voters in 1973 in response to uncontrolled construction of cheaply- 
built, over-priced apartments, is a major step towards temporary neighborhood
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control of land use. It contains the following elements:
1. Full neighborhood hearings on new construction and “general approval” 
by neighborhood residents as a precondition for new construction;
2. Provision for inclusion of at least 20 percent low-to-moderate income 
housing in new developments over four units;
3. Moratorium on demolition of older homes unless such demolition is tied 
to equivalent new replacement housing or the existing housing is unusable, un- 
reparable, or hazardous;
4. Revision of the Master Plan with full participation of neighborhoods.
The requirement that low-to-moderate income housing be provided in any
development was included to guarantee that new development would not be 
exclusively for wealthy residents. But proponents also understood that no pri­
vate, speculative developer would either desire to provide lower priced housing, 
or be able to afford such inclusion without subsidies. This in conjunction with 
market conditions has been a major reason for the halt in further demolition and 
speculative development in Berkeley.
The moratorium on demolition was included for similar reasons. Generally, 
demolition removes relatively lower priced housing—and often residents them­
selves—from the community. There are no regulations short of the moratorium 
that would prevent private developers from substituting upper income housing 
for existing lower-priced housing.
The effect of this clause in the Neighborhood Preservation Ordinance is to 
add at least equivalent legal requirements for relocation housing in the private 
sector that now apply to federally-funded redevelopment projects.
The moratorium also prevents tearing down the old housing stock which 
may be less profitable to speculators than new construction. This preserves 
Berkeley’s brown-shingle and Victorian housing-primarily an aesthetic con­
sideration, but very important to supporters of the Neighborhood Preservation 
Ordinance.
A major purpose of the Neighborhood Preservation Ordinance was to give 
the community interim control of development in the city while the land use 
master plan was under a two-year revision process.
However, while the Master Plan Revision Commission talked about what 
people in Berkeley would like, major land use decisions were being made despite 
the interim controls. This has included the major expansion of two hospitals and 
construction of several parking lots.
It is also not clear whether the Neighborhood Preservation Ordinance has 
adequately served the goals of protecting the lower-income housing supply. The
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ordinance enables neighborhoods to place a virtual freeze on new construction, 
thereby raising the value of single-family dwellings which are no longer faced with 
the possibility of neighboring multi-family buildings. But growth limits in the 
housing market do not automatically redistribute in favor of lower income people 
any more than the absence of limits does. Measures such as the Neighborhood 
Preservation Ordinance must be combined with the explicitly redistributive pro­
grams to effect significant changes in the housing market.
D. Housing Rehabilitation
While housing cooperatives are the preferred method for capturing increases 
of housing value due to city-supported rehabilitation, a city may sometimes need 
to sponsor programs for those lower-income people who are already homeowners. 
The city may be called upon to provide market rate loans if a neighborhood is 
red-lined by private lending institutions, or provide grants or loans at lower-than- 
market rates to lower-income homeowners.
The sources of capital for such grants and loans will be discussed in Chapter 
6. The essential criterion is that total housing costs be tied to the income level 
and ability-to-pay of the families-no more than 25 percent of adjusted gross 
income.
A recapture provision can replace interest payments for very low-income 
residents. When the owner wants to sell, or dies, the loan would be called or the 
property would revert to the city, which can select new residents or cooperative 
owners. This is the same principle of reciprocity with the community that 
should apply to all grants and other low-interest loans.
Rehabilitation programs can also be used as a mechanism to implement co­
operative housing conversion and land banking, which would reduce housing 
payments at the same time it improved the housing stock. Tenants could buy 
out their landlords to form rehabilitation cooperatives.
It is essential to insure that property owners who make use of low-interest 
loans under a rehabilitation program cannot raise rents in excess of the amount 
necessary to finance increased costs, and that the rehabilitation program is not 
used to aid speculation in housing. This can be accomplished through rent con­
trol and rent rollback provisions in conjuction with housing rehabilitation as well 
as through sale price restrictions.
E. Code Enforcement
A city can use code enforcement to improve housing for low-to-moderate 
income tenants by combining it with rent restrictions and resale control. A strict 
code enforcement program must be combined with protection for tenants be-
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cause landlords would otherwise immediately pass on the cost of repairs and in­
creased value of the property. Likewise, low-interest loans and grants must be 
made available to owner-occupants who cannot otherwise afford to repair their 
houses. Deed restrictions to prevent windfall profits on sales should be a condi­
tion of such loans.
The police powers of the city enable it to demand housing repairs of land­
lords without compensating them for the cost. If the landlord refuses, the city 
may make the required improvements at public expense, place a lien on the pro­
perty, and then sell the property—preferably to the tenants. An optimum program 
combining code enforcement with rent control would produce improvements in 
the housing stock, lower speculative profits, and protect tenants.
Code enforcement is a first step communities can take to maintain well- 
kept residences. But as with zoning, it only deals with problems caused by the 
private housing market. If the community wants true control over housing, it 
must fundamentally change the absentee ownership form of real estate tenure.
F. Community Ownership of Housing
The private housing market cannot now provide adequate housing to a 
majority of Berkeley residents at a cost they can afford. As one result, com­
munity ownership of housing is becoming a widely acceptable idea.
Non-profit cooperative ownership of housing could be the beginning of a 
solution to the chronic housing problems of low-to-moderate income people. 
Housing prices can be lowered because of (1) savings inherent in the cooperative 
structure, and (2) savings derived from a program built around a partnership be­
tween non-profit cooperative housing corporations and the city government.
Such a comprehensive program, formulated by Community Ownership Or­
ganizing Project (COOP) and submitted to the city council, is designated to assist 
low-to-moderate income people who are overwhelmingly renters. Housing pro­
vided by this program would remain perpetually available to the low-to-moderate 
income population.
In most areas, the program would have greatest applicability to the rehabil­
itation of housing converted from rental to cooperative ownership. It can also be 
used with equally favorable results in new construction.
1. Cooperative Ownership
People can own their housing cooperatively by means of a non-profit cor­
poration, which would hold one mortgage and retain equity for all the units. Co­
operative members would own and control their corporation by purchasing 
shares—one share per unit, one vote per share.
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Because cooperative housing can be 100 percent financed under various 
local, state or federal programs, the corporation does not need to raise significant 
capital from its members. Thus, the cost of a share can be nominal—little more 
than first and last months’ payment. Monthly payments would be set to cover 
the members’ share of the common mortgage plus expenses.
By transforming people who would otherwise be tenants into owners, the 
cooperative makes residents eligible for homeowners’ tax advantages. Coopera­
tive owners can deduct property tax and mortgage interest payments for Califor­
nia and federal income tax purposes. More importantly, each cooperative mem­
ber is eligible for the homeowner’s property tax exemption on the first $7,000 
of full market value per unit.
For low-income elderly, cooperative ownership offers even greater tax ad­
vantages: up to 96 percent rebate of property tax payments from the state or 100 
percent property tax exemption. Elderly renters in market housing are ineligible 
for this relief.
Because mortgage and equity are retained by the corporation rather than 
by members individually, periodic refinancing of the housing is unnecessary. To 
transfer ownership, the member who is moving out sells his or her share back to 
the cooperative for cost (possibly adjusted for inflation). The cooperative corpor­
ation then resells the share for the same price to a new member. The 6 percent 
real estate fee and other transfer charges play no part in this transaction.
Several cooperative housing programs are now operating in Berkeley. The 
University Students Cooperative Association was founded in 1933 because of 
the acute need for low-cost room and board. Student housing coops now have 
1,200 members in several campus locations.
The Savo Island Project will provide an additional 50 to 75 units of new 
cooperative-owned townhouses in an integrated neighborhood near the downtown 
area. Financing for the project, developed from a feasibility study prepared by 
the Community Ownership Organizing Project, involves the use of revenue shar­
ing money, tax-increment financing and the bonding authority of the Berkeley 
Redevelopment Agency. The elected board of the Savo Island Project Area Com­
mittee plans to further lower housing payments for the low-income coop resi­
dents by applying for federal rent subsidies under Section 8 of the 1974 Housing 
Act.
Despite these programs, most lower-income people continue to rent their 
homes at market rates, typically paying over 35 percent of their incomes for 
housing. The current city council majority is not committed to expediting com­
munity ownership of the housing stock. The minority that favors it does not yet 
have the power to implement the programs on a city-wide basis.
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2. Cooperatives as a prerequisite for a comprehensive program
By acting as mortgage lender to housing cooperatives, the city government 
can allow additional price reductions at no cost to itself. Loans can be issued to 
the housing cooperatives at below market rates using either savings (i.e., pension 
funds) or the city’s borrowing power.
Pension funds are the most promising source for long-term loans. Tradi­
tionally invested in long-term, low yield corporate bonds, pension funds can be 
redirected to local housing with no reduction in return or security.
Incredibly, policies guiding investment of large public pension funds show 
no local bias. Quite the contrary, the financial management of the funds is indis­
tinguishable from what would be expected of private money except for the low 
yield. California citizen groups have criticized city, county and state employee 
pension funds for investments in South Africa and in war-related industries, but 
generally have ignored the potential value of these funds for local economic 
development.
Pension funds are actuarially designed as long-term savings accounts, and 
so fit easily into the requirements of the housing market. The term of a mortgage 
is likely to be about equal to the work life of future pensioners, or approximately 
the 3040  year term typical of publicly assisted mortgages.
3. Low interest loans
In addition to redirecting the benefits of accumulated city accounts, lo­
cal government can borrow capital for community economic development. The 
city can raise additional capital by issuing municipal bonds, taking loans from 
private credit institutions, or borrowing from the public. It can then make lower- 
than-market interest loans to housing cooperatives using a number of alternative 
structures.
a. conventional level-payment mortgage loans—These are similar to mort­
gages available from savings and loans, but at lower interest rates. We do not re­
commend variable interest rate loans that savings and loan associations are begin­
ning to use.
b. index loans—These can only be made to cooperatives or other non-profit 
corporations. The loan payments start very low and are adjusted based on the 
ability to pay of the residents, increasing or decreasing according to a chosen 
index of wages or prices.
c. deferred interest loans—These are similar to index loans, except that the 
early payments are deferred until ability to pay increases. This allows people to 
get a housing project under way with little or no initial debt service.
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d. deferred land payments—This method allows the cooperative to pay off 
the loan for the improvements before making payments on the land purchase. 
Deferred land payments effectively increase the term of the loan to enable low- 
and moderate-income people to afford lower initial payments.
e. revolving funds—The city could also provide interim revolving funds to 
finance housing or projects before permanent financing has been arranged. Inte­
rest on this short-term money would be very low to encourage local development.
4. Grants
Besides lending to housing cooperatives, the city can provide outright 
grants to accommodate people who could not otherwise afford adequate housing.
a. Targeting state and federal grants to housing cooperatives
Community Development Revenue Sharing (CDRS) block grants and Com­
prehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) funds that are not specifically 
intended for housing can be directed to housing cooperatives, land write-downs, 
public improvements, rehabilitation financing, and labor costs.
Housing grant payments, made under Section 8 of the 1974 Federal 
Housing Act as rent supplements, can also be directed to the non-profit cooper­
atives in preference to rental housing. For grants where the cooperative must 
apply directly to the state or federal government, the city can act as a clearing­
house to prevent counter-productive competition between housing cooperatives, 
and as advocates for the housing cooperatives. The city can also keep the cooper­
atives informed of available external grants.
b. Land-banking and real estate reserves
City land assets can provide the basis of a grant program when the land is 
leased to housing cooperatives at token rents. The housing cooperatives can de­
velop housing on this land, buy the housing that may already be on the land, or 
rent both housing and land. The city keeps title to the land.
It is very important that the city make the grant by means of token rents 
rather than by transferring land title. Long-term public control of land use is 
best accomplished through direct public land ownership. Given a market context, 
zoning and subdivision controls have been the most common mechanisms of 
land use control. But they have been used most often to reflect the market rather 
than to control it, and have been used to discriminate among residents by race, 
class and income.
Cities and other local governments can increase the amount of publicly- 
owned land by:
-  retaining parcels that are already publicly owned,
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— buying land, vacant or with improvements, as it comes on the market,
— taking over abandoned or tax-lien properties when available, and
— receiving land title in return for low-interest rate loans used by coops to
convert from rental housing.
c. Grants from the general fund
Grants to housing cooperatives from the general fund could support a sub­
sidy fund, or services for low-income cooperative residents.
However, use of the general fund as a proper source of housing grants to 
lower-income people depends on successful tax reform. A general fund derived 
from progressive tax sources can be used to implement redistributive goals; a 
regressively-acquired general fund can, at best, be distributed back to the people 
who contributed most of it.
G. Other Reforms in the Housing Market
In addition to the methods for control of housing which have been dis­
cussed, a number of interim programs using conventional types of housing regu­
latory powers have been considered. They can be geared to restricting the 
abuses of the private housing market and providing a climate for community 
ownership by acting to reduce the value of income property prior to community 
acquisition.
1. Condemnation
For broadly-defined public purposes, the city has the right to condemn 
and purchase property as long as it compensates the owner. In many cases the 
condemnation process results in the' city paying more for a property than it 
would have brought at market prices. However, condemnation is often the only 
alternative when the city wishes to purchase a group of adjacent land parcels.
Most lower income groups have only been subject to the abuses of the 
condemnation process, opposing its use for urban renewal and highway construc­
tion. But condemnation can also be a useful tool to gain community control 
over the local economy.
2. Zoning and subdivision control
In the early stages of community organizing, zoning issues can pull many 
neighborhoods together in opposition to proposals that favor speculative de­
velopment.
With additional political power, however, communities can begin to 
control their own development by the use of zoning and subdivision. Market
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forces can be opposed in certain areas and encouraged in others to channel bene­
fits of the development process to public rather than private hands. Zoning, 
however, is primarily a defensive measure that does not really substitute for 
community planning. If land were owned and controlled by the community, the 
blunt instrument of zoning would not be necessary.
The concept of zoning is based on the idea of segregating land uses. In 
recent years, people in neighborhoods throughout Berkeley have demanded that 
their areas be down-zoned to the lowest possible residential classification. The 
zoning pattern that is emerging is one of universal low density, where any de­
velopment with higher densities is treated as a variance. This movement has 
grown directly from the increased power of low- and moderate-income neighbor­
hoods. They have demanded the same degree of control for themselves long 
exercised in the wealthier districts.
Zoning can also be used to partially expropriate property value. An area 
zoned for high density residential use that is subject to real estate speculation 
can be down-zoned to the lowest possible classifications, effectively reducing 
the value of the property. The courts have ruled that as long as improvements 
can be built on the property, such down-zoning does not represent a “taking” 
by the city that requires compensation.
3. Limits on condominium conversion
Some of the ownership benefits of cooperatives, such as homeowner 
property and income tax savings, can be realized by high-income tenants through 
condominiums. Their landlords do not lose; indeed they may make higher pro­
fits than if they sold the housing as income property. The private market in 
Berkeley is now heavily promoting condominiums as a market alternative to 
rental apartments which landlords cannot sell.
Condominium conversion removes tenants who are unable to afford the 
high purchase price. Rental units are in effect replaced by homeowner units 
available only to upper-income residents, because of high initial costs and con­
tinuous refinancing. Real estate speculation is often only worsened by condo­
minium conversion.
Berkeley residents have pushed for limitations on these conversions, now 
widespread in the Northeast, with eviction protection and first options to buy 
for existing tenants. A resale price restriction might also be applied, which would 
produce a condominium with similar long-term benefits to the cooperative 
form.
Each of the housing programs we have mentioned, from tenant union pres­
sure to cooperative housing forms, are intended as levers that will ultimately 
lead to community control and ownership of housing. Each is only a partial
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reform and could be easily circumvented by an aggressive private real estate 
board and its financial backers. But together the reforms consolidate both politi­
cal and economic power to help overturn the profit structure of the housing 
industry.
While housing programs are critical for community economic control, the 
cost of housing is interrelated with a number of other factors. These include the 
cost of land, utilities, labor and material, interest on loans, and the tax structure. 
Each of these affects the ability of a community to produce adequate housing 
that people can afford. Each is also an important factor in the overall control of 
the local economy.
Radical coalitions in Berkeley have attempted to implement commmunity 
control and ownership in a number of these related fields. The primary example 
for the past ten years has been the campaigns for community ownership of the 
electric power distribution system of PG&E.
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IV. UTILITIES
Community-owned utilities not only provide the important infrastructure 
of a city at costs well below those of the private market, but also could serve as 
the point of entry for broad public ownership of productive enterprise. Certain 
of the utilities, such as water, sewer and garbage collection, are already in wide­
spread public ownership. Several thousand U.S. cities also own their electric 
power distribution systems. Many also produce their own electricity as well. 
Municipally-owned telephone and coal gas systems were once common. A hand­
ful of cities now own and operate cable television systems. For the most part, 
costs to the residents for these services are lower than equivalent private utility 
rates, and the cities earn substantial revenues above in lieu tax payments.
The success of power production could be a stepping stone to other com­
munity-owned productive enterprise. The Tennessee Valley Authority originally 
intended to maintain public ownership of the nitrate and aluminum plants it 
created and supplied with power near Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Those proposals 
were gutted by private industry, but the potential still exists in local communities.
The political history of publicly-owned utilities is as important as present 
economic considerations. Small groups of citizens have fought for public owner­
ship in this area for nearly a century, battling the Insull Power Trust, the Bell 
system, corrupt regulatory agencies and bought judges. The people lost a lot of 
those battles, but they also won a few. The surviving systems across the country 
are living symbols of the successes and benefits of community ownership. They 
may not always be perfect symbols, but they are irrefutable proof that com­
munity ownership works.
A. Public Power
Local publicly-owned electric utilities exist in every state but Montana and 
Hawaii. The more than 2,000 systems include 1,893 municipally-owned electric 
utilities, and 109 state, county, or public utility district facilities. In addition, 
930 electric cooperatives serve large sections of rural America. Together, public 
and cooperative electric systems reach 22 percent of the population, or nearly 
50 million people.
The economics of public vs. private power are straightforward. Federal 
Power Commission figures for public and private utilities in 1971 show lower 
costs per kilowatt-hour (kwh) in virtually every aspect of the public systems’ 
operation. The savings are even more remarkable considering the typically 
smaller scale at which publicly-owned utilities operate (one-twentieth the size on 
the average).
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Exclusive of retained earnings, local publicly-owned utilities show an 
average of 30 percent lower costs per kwh delivered than private utilities (see 
Chart). Public systems spend less on advertising, less for public relations, less for 
lobbying, less for local political donations, less for accounting and collecting, 
less for executive salaries, and less for internal bureaucracy.
This efficiency applies to electric power generation as well. The 1971 FPC 
statistics report that municipal power systems have 10 percent less net electric 
plant per customer than the investor-owned utilities, but deliver 12.2 percent 
more kilowatt-hours per customer. Delivering more electricity per customer 
from less plant is a very good indication of efficient operation.
The second major benefit of public power is local control. Management 
of community-owned utilities is directly responsible to local residents, not to 
absentee owners. Basic decisions, such as plant location, rate of expansion, place­
ment of power lines, type of power generation, and electricity rates can be made 
in public forums. Community-owned systems have no built-in reason for “pad­
ding” the rate base, or for setting rates at other than a level consistent with costs 
and local policies.
The publicly-owned power systems should be expanded into geothermal, 
solar, methane, wind, and other energy sources. The city of Santa Clara already 
has a pilot splar energy program. Solar heating units in this area are now nearly 
competitive in price to natural gas service. In a very short time, community solar 
utilities could well compete with natural gas service, especially if the price of 
natural gas is deregulated.
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The Berkeley struggle to own its electrical distribution system goes back 
about ten years. In the mid-sixties, advocates of public power, supported by the 
recommendation of the then city manager, attempted to commission a feasi­
bility study of public ownership. It was not until 1971, with the issue coming up 
each year, that the council agreed to commission the study. A relatively con­
servative engineering firm was chosen, approved by both Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company and the by then desperate public power advocates.
The feasibility study showed a clear pattem of future profits for the city 
of Berkeley, even though the projections were based on low utility rates (which 
have risen ten times faster than projected), and high costs of operation and 
acquisition of the system. A public power measure16 was put on the ballot 
during the 1973 municipal election. PG&E and corporate friends spent over 
$100,000 to defeat it, and also contributed heavily to the slate of corporate 
liberal candidates for city council which opposed the measure. The ordinance 
was defeated by a 42 percent to 58 percent vote.
The technical nature of the report enabled opponents of the measure to 
confuse much of the electorate during the campaign. The same feasibility study 
was used to “prove” that public power would bankrupt the city and force cut­
backs in social programs serving the minority communities. PG&E flyers also 
emphasized the supposed inability of the city to run an electric distribution 
system, a claim that ignores the more than 2,000 municipal, district, and co­
operatively-owned utilities in the country.
The Committee for Public Power again placed the initiative on the ballot 
in 1974,17 this time in the wake of election reform and huge PG&E rate in­
creases. The committee was still vastly outspent, but it won 47.5 percent of the 
vote—a significant increase. For now the issue is dormant, but a regional group 
called Electricity and Gas for People (E&GP—turn PG&E around) has been 
continually exposing the profit-hungry activities of the utility. These activities 
will improve the chances for public power in Berkeley.
B. Cable Television
Community-owned cable television not only can provide extraordinary 
public services and ultimately contribute generously to the general fund, but also 
holds the potential for a wide range of city functions. Use of CATV channels by 
the city government, school system, public health, public works, fire and police 
departments could easily provide sufficient benefits to warrant any internal sub­
sidies necessary for community equipment pods and programming.
There are presently 14 community-owned cable television systems in the 
country, the largest in San Bruno, California, on the San Francisco peninsula.
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The existing systems are generally in small towns, but generate substantial in­
come for local government.
Despite the potentially high profitability of CATV operations over the life 
of a system, initial capitalization and apprehension about the technology con­
tinue to persuade many cities to grant private franchises rather than undertake 
the enterprise themselves.
Larger cities have also been reluctant to undertake operation of the system 
because private cable companies in the urban areas have often lost money. Signal 
reception in the cities tends to be good, with a large number of broadcast sta­
tions to choose from. Urban cable companies realize they must offer new ser­
vices to attract subscribers, but many simply have not been able to raise the 
capital to develop two-way communications or other innovative uses of the cable.
Berkeley has been squabbling with its CATV franchise since the day the 
system began operation in 1971. Bay Cablevision is currently in violation of 
performance, public service, and cable undergrounding requirements, and has 
not paid the minimum $40,000 franchise fee to the city for the past two years. 
For its part, the city refuses to grant subscriber rate increases or official suspen-, 
sion of franchise requirements until the system makes its payments to the 
general fund. The two parties have been at a standoff for more than a year.
The city could easily sue Bay Cablevision for breach of contract, but the 
present council majority is not committed to public ownership, and it fears 
angering the remaining subscribers by throwing the system out of town.
A citizen’s CATV Commission was established in 1974 to review the exist­
ing contract and make recommendations to the council. There is now consider­
able support on the commission for eventual community ownership, but no 
chance of securing the necessary funds from the council majority for a formal 
feasibility study. Until a detailed financial study of public ownership can be 
made, city council and commission alike are willing to let Bay Cablevision die 
a natural death.
Financing for a community-owned system will normally by available through 
borrowing with city revenue bonds, or directly out of city long-term savings. 
Minority communities may in addition be eligible for federal funds, such as a 
MESBIC minority enterprise loan.
C. Telephone Systems
The 1,500 small private and rural cooperative telephone companies in the 
U.S. offer the best evidence of a continuing financial rationale for community 
ownership. Operating in a market dominated by AT&T, these small systems 
generally maintain good service, solid growth, and often substantial return for in­
vestors or surpluses for user-owners.
34
The U.S. once had a great number of municipal telephone systems. Today 
only nine systems remain—four in Alaska, one in Puerto Rico, and four rural sys­
tems in the Midwest. But this does not mean publicly-owned systems are not 
feasible. Among the Alaska systems are Fairbanks and Anchorage, well-run muni­
cipal urban telephone operations. The Puerto Rican system serves the entire island, 
with nearly 350,000 telephones in San Juan alone. Municipal telephone systems 
are still prevalent in the western provinces of Canada.
With the exception of urban nightmares like New York City, wiring a com­
munity with switching equipment and routing calls beyond local borders is a rel­
atively simple matter. There is no compelling reason to duplicate AT&T’s corpo­
rate structure, or its employment, service, and financial practices on the local level.
Local systems, public or private, have the option of purchasing low-cost 
equipment from the Asian markets at a considerable savings from AT&T-admini­
stered Western Electric prices. Community systems might also subscribe to alter­
native long-stance relay systems now emerging from the specialized carrier 
industry.
The possible acquisition of the local telephone system in Berkeley has been 
suggested in all past Coalition platforms. However, no serious efforts have been 
made to commission a feasibilty study or catalyze public support.
There have been relatively few condemnations of public utility facilities in 
the U.S., and none in the telephone industry. But the California State Constitu­
tion, and those of several other states, include “communications” as a legitimate 
municipal responsiblity. Condemnation proceedings would approximate those 
used against private power companies, involving either the State Public Utilities 
Commission or the courts.
D. Combined Communication Services
The services currently being offered by competing firms in the telecom­
munications field are the most diverse ever. Whole urban systems could be built 
with low-cost Asian equipment, customized interconnection, specialized carrier 
service via microwave and coaxial cables, and complementary CATV networking. 
An aggressive, farsighted community could finance such a total communications 
resource through tax-exempt bonds, and own it for posterity. Such systems would 
not only produce local jobs and retain community revenue, but also would 
broaden the scope and definition of the terms “utility” and “public service.”
On a more immediate level, cities can own and operate radio, broadcast 
television and newspaper operations. For example, New York City currently 
operates a radio station, WNYC. These have been discussed but not formally 
nroposed as part of the Coalition program in Berkeley.
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V. REVENUE PRODUCING 
ENTERPRISES
Community ownership of utilities opens the door to public enterprise in a 
wide range of industries. The economic rationale for public utilities still applies- 
lower than market cost of capital, internal efficiency, tax benefits, and most of 
all, no stockholders to drain off the surplus. But there is a social rationale for ex­
panded public enterprise as well. There are many real unmet public needs for 
goods and services in the community that private business will not provide. Public 
enterprise could use internal savings to subsidize production that otherwise 
would not yield sufficient profit to interest private investors.
Public enterprise should not, however, be used as the dumping ground for 
private market failures. Railway systems ai£ great examples of corporations 
drained dry by their owners, who then toss the hulks to the public. As part of 
the bargain, public enterprise can then be blamed for the ensuing problems.
Most public enterprise should be designated to at least break even. Com­
munity corporations can produce public savings as a surplus without apology.
The Berkeley coalitions have been primarily interested in expanding the 
democratically controlled sector of the economy, not necessarily only by means 
of community ownership. The Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley enjoys wide 
community support, providing a range of consumer services unheard of in most 
other U.S. cities. Production, distribution and craft cooperatives abound, ranging 
from pharmacies to food conspiracies. In each case there is a dramatic increase in 
the amount of democratic control over the growth, direction, and pace of work.
Most cities are already deeply involved in a wide variety of enterprises. 
They operate parking garages, transportation systems, garbage collection, water 
and sewer service, public utilities, port facilities, marinas, taxis and airports.
Charter cities in California have extraordinary powers to engage in produc­
tive enterprise. Nearby Oakland owns and operates a profitable sports complex, 
a commercial containerized shipping port, and the international airport. Berkeley 
owns and operates a marina and several summer camps.
The public enterprises discussed in this section are primarily new services 
that cities and cooperatives have not often attempted. They are plainly specula­
tive proposals, but they hold great promise as revenue-producing businesses for 
the public.
A. Banking
Banks in low-income areas or in many cities do not reinvest in their own
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communities, thus draining capital from those communities for investment and 
profits elsewhere. The city can develop a community bank, with a Board of 
Directors representing broad segments of the community and policies which re­
direct savings back into the businesses and neighborhoods of the city. The bank 
can invest deposits of the city government as well as provide short-term liquid 
funds to the community as a primary source of development capital.
The bank could set up a credit union, encourage a local savings program, 
and earmark its investment funds for community development corporations, Co­
operatives, small businesses, and city enterprise. Direct city enterprise could be 
initiated by a department of the city government, or by a community develop­
ment corporation set up to carry out the investment function.
The bank can also serve as the funnel for money raised by the city for co­
operative, Community Development Corporation, or public enterprises. This 
money can be raised through bonds, special taxes, fees, grants, or revenue-produ­
cing enterprises. The bank can also make loans which go far beyond the original 
amount of the deposits as well as generate multiplier effects throughout the local 
economy.
An economic development corporation (EDC), run by the city and com­
munity representatives, could be combined with the municipal bank. It is impor­
tant to make the distinction between business-oriented development corporations 
and community-oriented economic development. The function o f the EDC would 
be to analyze the local economy, plan where potentialities for development exist, 
balance this development with the local environment and the need for employ­
ment, and invest in public and community enterprises. It can also be an impor­
tant source of risk capital.
À city-run bank or development corporation can be a very important way 
of combining CDRS and CETA funds, Small Business Administration and Eco­
nomic Development Administration money, and other federal grants for invest­
ment in community enterprises. Under the present system, much of this money 
is widely distributed in many fragmented programs. Very rarely is a concerted 
effort made to put together a package that combines economic development, 
public employment, and use of small business loans. A bank or a community de­
velopment corporation that is able to harness the federal funds as they come in, 
put them together and rechannel them to the local area would be an extremely 
important mechanism for redistribution. It is this economic development and 
planning capacity that we are attempting to encourage throughout the community.
Depending on state regulation, the city could establish a mortgage bank as 
well as a commercial bank. This would allow significant changes in such common 
policies as redlining that segregates housing by income and race. The bank could 
use some of the techniques enumerated earlier, such as index loans, low-interest 
conventionally structured loans, and deferred interest loans.
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B. Commercial Enterprise
1. Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley
The city of Berkeley has one of the largest and oldest networks of cooper­
ative services in the country. Consumers Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc., began in 
1938, a joint venture of local buying clubs that had formed during the depres­
sion and the Finnish Brotherhood. The Finnish community assumed leadership 
of the cooperative during its early years.
Consumers Co-op now has three supermarkets in Berkeley, accounting for 
fully one-third of the food purchases in the city. Associated cooperative enter­
prises include a gas station and garage, a health food store, three bakeries, a gar­
den shop, a hardware store, a wilderness shop, three pharmacies, a credit union, 
travel service, group legal service, an arts and crafts store, and a new group health 
plan. Separate corporations associated with the Co-op are Books Unlimited, 
Twin Pines Savings and Loan, the East Bay Funeral Society, and Mutual Service 
Insurance.
The Consumers Co-op has opened branch supermarkets in El Cerrito, Oak­
land, San Francisco, Walnut Creek, Castro Valley, and Corte Madera. It has a 
long association with the Palo Alto Cooperative and a regional wholesaling coop 
dating back to 1935.
The Co-op supermarkets have developed a great number of consumer ser­
vices that have often led to similar changes in commercial stores. The Co-op first 
began unit pricing, “lifeline” low-cost basic food supplies, cost-saving recipes, 
and home economists on duty at all stores. The supermarkets have specialty food 
sections for ethnic communities, and supervised child care.
Pushed by its own membership and supermarket “center councils,” the 
Co-op has made a series of strong policy decisions favoring consumers and union 
workers. It purchases United Farm Worker produce, has banned all aerosol cans 
from its shelves as ecologically hazardous, and is currently making attempts to 
deal directly with farmworker production cooperatives in California’s San Joaquin 
Valley.
More than 40,000 Berkeley residents are owner-members of the Consumers 
Cooperative. By purchasing one or more $5.00 shares, members receive cash re­
bates at the end of the year for purchases made at any cooperative store. Elected 
Co-op officers and council members at each of the three centers encourage citizen 
participation in determining store policy. The Co-op is the largest example of 
democratically controlled enterprise in the city.
2. City-sponsored cooperatives
Berkeley could use its investment capacity to control, through membership
39
and operation, commercial shops and districts in the city. Its policies could halt 
over-dev*] opment and congestion in some neighborhoods and redirect the develop­
ment in others. The city might help with the financing of existing cooperatives, 
and encourage the Berkeley Co-op to expand into more low-income neighbor­
hoods. The city might also encourage a coordinated wholesale distribution system 
from the larger cooperatives to those on the neighborhood level.
Farmers’ markets and leasing of space for individual sellers of food and 
craft products can both counteract rising prices due to monopoly pricing and 
also give a small return to the city in the form of licenses and/or leases on pre­
viously unused city space. The city can also provide facilities for small food 
buying cooperatives to use, and can establish and work with cooperatives in the 
purchase of a wide variety of consumer goods.
In conjunction with cooperatives and “food conspiracies,”  the city or a 
major cooperative could provide an outlet for food stamps. The Berkeley Co-op 
now provides an outlet through its credit union, a building adjacent to one of 
the major Co-op supermarkets.
3. Cooperative health care services
Americans work about one month out of every year to pay for health care 
and health facilities. For a city the size of Berkeley, these payments—whether in 
the form of insurance payments, doctor and hospital bills, or taxes which are in 
turn channeled to doctors and hospitals—represent significant capital outflow. 
Nominally the payments already go to non-profit institutions, but in reality the 
inflated costs and fees represent very high profits. The return to the community 
in terms of care of the sick and prevention of disease is low when compared with 
the high price.
A community-owned and operated Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO), in addition to its intended benefits, can also be seen as a capital invest­
ment in the community. Retention of health payments by the community can 
rectify the inhumane, maldistributed health care that seems to be inevitable 
otherwise. A community-owned HMO would also be eligible for state and federal 
health care grants, attracting needed capital to the city.
The Co-op Health Care Study, sponsored by Consumers’ Cooperative of 
Berkeley, recently completed a feasibility report of a community-owned HMO. 
The proposed plan would provide pre-paid care at neighborhood-based primary 
care centers. Home care would be encouraged, but hospitalization would be avail­
able at existing facilities.
The most significant difference between the Co-op HMO and conventional 
pre-paid plans (such as the Kaiser Health Flan, to which 40 percent of Berkeley 
Co-op members subscribe) is consumer control of the cooperative health plan.
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Members would elect the board of directors and district councils. Active partici­
pation by the public, which now occurs at the other Co-op enterprises in Berkeley, 
would be encouraged.
The feasiblity report suggested that cooperative ownership and control can 
also help solve many problems associated with conventional health plans. These 
include over-hospitalization, over-use of technological diagnostics and therapeutic 
procedures, over-prescription of drugs, reliance on physicians for routine proce­
dures that could be performed by nurses or paraprofessionals, the passive role of 
patients in their own care, and depersonalized health care. The proposal also re­
commends compulsory arbitration of grievances between patients and doctors, 
and exploration of alternative healing forms.
If the Cooperative HMO recieves federal approval, it will begin soliciting 
members in 1976.
C. Recycling Services
The economics of recycling seem to be favorable for returning a positive 
profit and employing new workers. If recycling is combined with garbage pickup 
and economic incentives for source separation (i.e., higher garbage bills for un­
separated garbage), it can work successfully for metals and glass. The market for 
paper is more unstable. Markets will vary with local conditions; agreements with 
companies to purchase recycled materials should be closely examined and 
developed first.
The Berkeley Recycling Center, AnandaMarga Recycling Center, and Third 
World Recycling Site all operate in the city.
D«, Insurance
Since insurance is essentially the business of socializing risk, the city itself 
could assume an insurance function. Berkeley has been self-insured for the past 
five years, anyway, from the day private companies terminated their policies 
when street demonstrations were most aggressive.
The city has a large enough population base to attract capital from pre­
miums and pay claims. The insurance business is both profitable and a major 
source of investment capital that the city could recycle within the community. 
The full range of insurance services could be provided, including home, auto, 
personal, business, fire, professional and property title insurance.
E. Real Estate Services
City councilmember John Denton and realtor Arlene Slaughter proposed
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ten years ago that the city provide rental and sales listing services and associated 
real estate brokerage services at cost to the community. The University of Cali­
fornia now operates a multiple-listing service that covers about one-third of the 
student housing. The proposed community service would be city-wide, covering 
most real estate sales and rentals, as well as related services.
In addition, there are possibilities for some kind of municipal real estate 
evaluation, including inspection, termite eradication, and various associated ser­
vices—title search, title insurance, holding insurance and property tax trust funds. 
This service might be especially useful to buyers and sellers of lower-priced 
housing, since the private real estate firms charge a great deal of money for only 
perfunctory service to low-income residents.
The main job of matching buyers with sellers is provided through the multi­
ple listings, which could be either used directly, replaced or supplemented with a 
city listing service.
Real estate services could be quite profitable for the city, even at much re­
duced prices from the private market. Real estate and brokerage fees are now 
commonly 6 percent of the price of a house-extremely high for the minimal 
cost of the service.
The city could at the very least save the fees it now pays to private real 
estate firms as rental fees for property the city leases from private landlords.
The private brokerage firms also encourage income and racial segregation 
in housing. A city brokerage service would have control of policy, enabling signi­
ficant changes in this pattern.
F. Tourism and Youth Hostels
Downtown hotels often fall into disrepair and become unprofitable to 
operate. The city can convert these to youth hostels or cheap tourist accommo­
dations, and revitalize downtown areas.
A system of youth hostels similar to those in Europe should prove profit­
able for the city, and be of great service to the large number of travelers who 
come through Berkeley. Attempts have been made by the council to provide 
these accommodations during the summer, but this has been done reluctantly 
because of the counter-culture lifestyle of the travelers.
G. Expanded Public Services
Local governments already have the capacity to do many different kinds 
of work. These services can be sold to the public, either at cost as a non-subsi- 
dized help for community-owned enterprise, or as a potential source of city 
revenue. The services might include job training and placement, legal aid, com-
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puter services, printing, billing, construction, property maintenance, and manage­
ment and accounting. Each city operation could be set according to the most 
efficient level, taking advantage of economies of scale where appropriate.
For services where smaller scale operations are more efficient, the city 
could reverse the process, purchasing from small decentralized community-owned 
enterprises. A few services have on occasion been contracted out previously by 
the city of Berkeley.
1. Introducing the criterion of self-support for certain services
When upper-income people were in comfortable control of city govern­
ment, they provided themselves with some very attractive services which were 
subsidized out of the general fund. With a change in power, these services need 
to be put on a self-supporting basis. Included in the concept of self-support is an 
internal subsidy for lower income residents.
One example is the summer camps operated for families and children in 
the city. Berkeley now charges fees that come closer to self-support than in past 
years. But the camps are still partially supported out of the general fund.
2. Carpool and fleet services
The fleet of cars owned and maintained by the city of Berkeley could be 
rented to individuals, community groups, or small businesses in the city. Prices 
could range from cost to competitive market fees, depending on the renter (cer­
tain community groups and fledgling coops might be eligible for the services 
at cost).
Advance scheduling would allow the city to use its car fleet on weekends 
as well as during work days, and keep a fleet of the most efficient size.
The school district, which has a large fleet of buses, now provides charter 
bus services to non-profit organizations at cost. Even without a margin of profit, 
this service is beneficial to the school district financially because it can carry 
overhead and capitalize equipment more efficiently. The advantages to the non­
profit groups are lower prices than they could find from private charter companies.
3. Urban gardening
In the flatlands of South and West Berkeley, there are over 60 acres of va­
cant and abandoned land, covered with briars, strewn with rubbish and infested 
with rats. If used properly, this land could provide food for nearly 8,000 people.
In May 1975, the city council voted to allow citizens to use vacant city- 
owned land for gardening, and members of the Organic Farmers of Berkeley 
have begun to prepare four lots for planting, The harvest from the land will be 
used to feed needy people in the city.
Organic Farmers of Berkeley intend to hold “plant-ins” on land owned by 
the East Bay Municipal Utilities District,Pacific Gas and Electric, Bay Area Rapid
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Transit and the federal and state governments. Food from this land could supply 
a significant part of the fresh fruit and vegetable requirements of the city’s low- 
income residents.
While gardening and farming would constitute new city services, the city 
already provides rototilling services, tree-trimming, and nursery stock. These and 
other available community resources could easily be used by gardeners on public 
land. The leaf mold, shredded tree trimmings and sewer sludge collected by the 
city’s Parks Department could be usedfor fertilizer and garden mulch. University 
of California Exteffsion already provides soil testing, plant disease, and insect 
management services. The city’s CETA workers could be used to prepare ground 
for planting, as they have done on land near the West Berkeley Health Center. 
Community health workers now tend the garden during lunch hour and after 
closing. Organic Farmers of Berkeley is attempting to coordinate the existing 
community resources into an effective urban gardening program.
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VI. CAPITAL: REVENUE AND 
CREDIT
The problems encountered by proposals for public ownership of land, 
housing, utilities and revenue-producing enterprises all return to the same po in t- 
control of capital. If commercial banks were the only source of development 
capital, widespread community ownership would remain just a distant possibility. 
But cities have the power to raise capital and borrow money, and to control the 
wealth within municipal boundaries. As long as those devices are available for 
use by people elected by the voters, community ownership and control of enter­
prise is a feasible alternative to continued corporate dominance of the economy.
One of the first barriers to overcome is the popular mythology that cities 
are nearly bankrupt, that they have few financial alternatives at their disposal, 
and that cbntrol of all capital is in the hands of outsiders—the banks, the corpor­
ations, the county, state and federal governments. The fact is that there are pos­
sibilities—admittedly often limited by law—for a city to capture and rechannel 
its own wealth in a progressive manner.
The first step in breaking down the myth of bankruptcy is to take stock 
of the real assets of the community. Berkeley’s 120,000 residents and economic 
institutions generate over $1 billion dollars in annual income from all sources. 
The city has the largest university in the state of California, and substantial real 
estate, financial, and industrial assets. Lower income residents suffer directly 
from the unwillingness of the city to follow policies that would use this wealth 
in a progressive or redistributive way.
Central to the alternative uses of municipal finances is the implicit banking 
function of the city government. Ideally the city can use its existing assets to in­
ternally finance public and community enterprise, which can then circulate the 
resulting revenues within the community.
We should make clear that many of the mechanisms described in this sec­
tion do not necessarily have intrinsic merit, in the sense of being automatically 
redistributive or automatically increasing the capital available for community use. 
In fact, many of them are used routinely by those now in power to maintain the 
city as the instrument of the wealthy and privileged. We raise these devices here as 
examples of the ways in which communities which are interested in controlling 
and redistributing their own wealth can harness some of the already existing 
financial capacities of the city.
Only a bare 10 percent of Berkeley’s $50 million in annual revenue comes 
directly from local corporations. One-fourth of the city’s income derives from
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the property tax, one-fourth from federal, state and county aid, one-fourth from 
the sales tax, and one-fourth from fees for service. Despite the long-standing 
belief that the property and sales tax have reached their limits as a source of city 
revenue, Berkeley joins most other cities ip balking at progressive tax levies.
Berkeley is now faced with a budget squeeze common to many other cities. 
The property tax base is relatively fixed—the city has no more land to annex. 
Berkeley is bordered by the wealthy residential tax enclave of Kensington on 
one side, and the industrial tax enclave of Emeryville on the other. Within city 
boundaries, the University of California and extensive state and private charitable 
property is tax exempt. This restricted tax base, combined with an unusually 
wide variety of city services, has produced one of the highest city tax rates in the 
state of California.
Banks, insurance companies and corporations have been busy in the 
California legislature having themselves exempted from any potential taxes. 
They pushed through a constitutional amendment that prevents cities from 
levying non-property taxes on banks, insurance companies, finance companies or 
personal income. The property tax was thereby narrowed to a tax on land, 
houses, offices and factories. The corporate headquarters of insurance companies 
are not subject to any property taxes whatsoever. Finally, there has been a 
gradual equalization of property tax assessment on business with that on 
residential property, an erosion of earlier tax policy favoring homeowners that 
was recently made official in the Petris-Knox Act.
Originally, the city taxed the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and the 
Pacific Telephone Company. However, the California Supreme Court ruled that 
the telephone company state franchise, under the California Public Utilities 
Code, applies also to the streets of California cities. Therefore, the telephone 
company discontinued annual franchise payments to the city and currently pays 
only a small annual business license. PG&E continues to pay taxes on its capital 
equipment and real estate within the city, but at state assessed rates well under 
actual value. The local cable television franchise agreed to pay the city a 
minimum of $40,000 a year against 8 percent of its revenue from subscriber 
fees, but the company has defaulted on its payments for the past two years.
Current Berkeley revenue policies follow a nationwide trend toward in­
direct, fragmented taxes that are both generally regressive and difficult to 
perceive by the public. Sales taxes, excise taxes, and gasoline taxes all hurt 
low-income people most, but do not overly antagonize powerful business and 
real estate interests. Indirect taxes are levied to avoid taxpayer resistance.
The tax and revenue sources proposed by the Coalition were recom­
mended both for the size of their potential contribution to city funds and for 
their redistributive effect on the city economy. A municipal income tax has been 
the first choice of Berkeley progressives as a revenue source for many years.
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Second choice would be a capital gains tax on property transfers. But since these 
may not be politically possible to levy, we have listed a number of alternative 
taxes that are also progressively structured.
Because virtually all of these taxes affect business and real estate interests, 
their passage will require broad public understanding and support. Many of the 
taxes will also be challenged in the courts if they are levied. But versions of these 
taxes—from the municipal income tax to the property transfer and transient 
occupancy taxes—presently are in effect in American cities. The taxes can be 
levied, with sufficient leadership and community support.
A. Taxation
1. Progressive income tax on businesses, corporations, commuters and 
residents
A progressive city income tax would increase the tax base by taxing in­
come of residents, and incomes made in the city by commuters who use city 
services but don’t pay for them. It would tax business income, which the pro­
perty tax does not. It also falls less heavily on those with fixed incomes, and re­
vises itself with inflation.
Councilwoman Hancock proposed a test-case income tax18 which never re­
ceived much discussion at the council level. The tax was designed to be tested in 
the courts, since California state law forbids a municipal income tax. The legal 
issues would pit the sovereignty of charter cities against the power of the state 
legislature. The Hancock proposal was referred to the city financial staff, where 
it received favorable comment, and was then condemned by the council majority 
to a “committee” on revenue and taxation that has never met.
A municipal income tax is only desirable for purposes of redistribution if 
it includes certain principles of taxation. These include:
a. the ability of the city to levy at its own progressive rates;
b. the ability of the city to set its own tax base, exemptions, deductions, 
adjustments, and definition of taxable income;
c. the ability of the city to tax the incomes of commuters as well as 
residents;
d. the ability of the city to tax business and corporate income.
The Hancock proposal attempted to meet these criteria. For ease in ad­
ministration, the city would distribute a “short form” based on the state income
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tax return to each resident and wage-earner. Inequities such as capital gains de­
ductions can be corrected at the local level by a provision adding the specified 
line back into the tax computation.
The municipal income tax can generate substantial revenues even with full 
exemptions for households earning up to $10,000 per year. Initial rates can be 
low, ranging from .25 percent to 1 percent of taxable income. The Berkeley pro­
posal set low rates for the purpose of establishing the legality of the tax and test­
ing public response, after which rates could be readjusted to distribute the bur­
den fairly.
Tax formulas are available which can estimate the percentage of income 
generated by a branch of a company which operates both within and outside of 
the city.
The city income tax should be tied to a reduction or elimination of the 
city government’s share of local property taxes. Replacing the property tax with 
income taxes, however, can only be partially accomplished at the city level. The 
property taxes paid by Berkeley residents are also determined by an autonomous 
school district, the county, and a multitude of special districts ranging from 
transportation and junior college to mosquito abatement. The city has no con­
trol over the tax rates set by these districts.
Even if it could be accomplished, there are other significant problems 
with complete substitution of a city income tax for property taxes. Such sub­
stitution will provide windfall profits to landlords and will hurt some tenants if 
there are no provisions for rent rollbacks. The Berkeley proposal was made while 
rent control provisions were in effect, which would have provided for rent roll­
backs with the tax reductions. Without rollback provisions, cities will find the 
income tax politically unpopular.
For small and medium-sized cities within metropolitan areas, a municipal 
income tax may work best on a regional basis. This is desirable so that businesses 
will not be tempted to move to avoid the tax, and so commuters will not be 
doubly taxed.
Also, despite the formulas, it is difficult for city taxing authorities to po­
lice branch office businesses that account their profits elsewhere.
In Berkeley, the income tax will work especially well since the city has a 
commuter population much higher than the regional level. Even with the as­
sumption that 50 percent of all income falls under exemptions, there is still a 
taxing base of $500 million in Berkeley. An average 1 percent tax would pro­
duce $5 million, and an average 2 percent tax would produce enough to totally 
eliminate the city’s portion of the property tax.
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2. Progressive capital gains tax on property transfers
The capital gains tax can simultaneously secure new revenues for city 
programs from the wealthy and reduce the impact of real estate speculation, 
which causes continuous increases in housing prices. The tax base consists of the 
difference between the sale price and purchase price of all real property, minus 
expenditures on improvements. Exemptions can be built in, protecting small 
homeowners and allowing for increases in the general price level. The tax should 
be directed at the larger property owners and the capital gains income made 
from speculation. It is simple to administer, can net substantial revenues and is 
not passed on to renters. A nominal tax in Berkeley would net almost $1 million 
in revenues a year. The tax should be tied to a specific program such as housing 
rehabilitation or land banking for political and educational, as well as economic 
reasons.
A simpler version of the capital gains tax is a property transfer tax that has 
a large exemption. This would not be as progressive and does not meet certain 
of the capital gains criteria. But it is a simple formula—the sale price with an 
exemption of $30,000, or the median price of a house in the community-and 
might be easier to pass and uphold in the courts than a capital gains tax.
California cities could structure a capital gains tax, ordinarily looked at as 
an income tax, as a property transfer tax. This tactic might avoid many of the 
legal questions with regard to state pre-emption that would follow passage of an 
income tax.
The city of Berkeley once had a property transfer tax. It was voted out in 
1967 by a referendum sponsored by real estate interests. The tax was based on a 
straight percentage of the real estate sale price without features written in to 
make it progressive.
3. Progressive business fees
When Coalition candidates first took office, the Berkeley business license 
tax was regressive and quite small. Businesses were taxed per employee, with the 
amount diminishing as the number of employees increased. The city was taking 
in only $350,000 annually from business license fees. The council agreed that 
business license taxes should be doubled, based on the same fee schedule. How­
ever, the staff of Coalition council members recommended making the tax non- 
regressive, by applying it in a straight-line method per employee. Revenues from 
the tax were subsequently doubled without significant harm to small businesses, 
and with substantially more coming in from large businesses. Even at this higher 
rate, the business tax was generally considered a nuisance tax that did not affect 
business decisions to stay in the community. It is an insignificant percentage of 
the operating expenses of most local businesses.
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Because the municipal income tax was blocked by legal restrictions, the 
Coalition councilmembers attempted to pass a gross receipts tax as an alternative, 
which involved taking a percentage of gross receipts of all businesses operating in 
the city. This tax can be applied to professionals, such as University of California 
professors who make substantial income from consulting fees.
One major loophole in the business license tax is that banks and insurance 
companies are exempt by state law from any local business taxes.
4. Front-face tax
A front-face tax would tax the square footage of street frontage, rather 
than using the linear foot assessment basis. This would tax high-rise developments 
in the downtown districts by keying assessment to the total square footage of 
the building face. In Berkeley, this tax was included by Hancock and Kelley in 
their 1974-75 budget proposal but was rejected by the council majority. It is es­
pecially favorable in Berkeley, where the front faces of banks (exempt from bus­
iness license taxes by state law) are large, and where there is widespread resis­
tance to further high-rise development in the downtown area.
5. Luxury taxes
The general concept here should be to tax those activities which tend to be 
used by wealthier people, or by out-of-towners who get the benefit of city 
expenditures.
a. Hotel room tax. This tax raises revenue from people in transit who use 
city facilities. It should be levied as a percentage of room charges rather than a 
flat, per-room fee. The city can set up graduated percentage schedules or 
exemptions depending on the cost of the hotel, to encourage the availability of 
low rates. The progressive restructuring of this tax, proposed by Hancock and 
Kelley in 1974, has not been accepted by the council majority.
b. Surcharge on yacht berthing fees and Marina real estate rentals. Wealthy 
people using the city-owned Marina should be charged what the market will bear 
for yachting berths. The tax can essentially be used as a pricing mechanism for 
profit maximization by the city, raising the fees until there are vacancies. Tying 
the tax to some related function, such as subsidizing boats available on a cooper­
ative basis, maintenance of public facilities, or transit to the Marina, may be 
necessary because of bond and tidewater use restrictions. Tax-tying may also be 
useful to emphasize the redistributive nature of the fees.
Marina real estate leases are consistently under market value in Berkeley 
compared to surrounding communities. City revenues should be maximized 
through either fees, taxes, or by renegotiating the leases. All city leases should be 
on the overage basis, or renegotiated regularly. This increased revenue source has
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been mentioned in every Coalition platform and budget proposal. It has been 
consistently rejected by the city council.
c. Sports and entertainment tax. An entertainment tax should be levied on 
those events that serve either an out-of-town public or that generally serve a 
wealthy audience. Movies and some sports activities are an unlikely choice since 
these tend to be working people’s entertainment.
In 1974,Berkeley enacted a sports events tax19, such as on Oakland Raider 
games that were played in the University of California stadium. The city of Ber­
keley is completely congested on game days, having aU of its streets and park­
ing lots used essentially by out-of-towners. A legal challenge to the law by the 
Oakland Raiders was upheld in the courts, overturning the council action.
d. Conservation fees. Conservation fees are based on the concept of taxing 
polluting industries in the city. The industries involved would be taxed or pay 
fees structured to create a financial incentive for them to stop the pollution.
Another concept that pertains to electric utilities is a combination conser­
vation fee and lifetime tax rebate. This would involve a progressive utility tax 
applied to utility rates so that the more electricity used, the higher the tax. The 
collected tax would then be applied as a rebate to those using less electricity.
This is not a utility users tax, which is based on a straight percent of the 
electric bill and is highly regressive. City voters repealed a utility user’s tax by 
initiative in 1971. The conservation fee is an alternative to restructured rates 
possible at the local level with community-owned power. The fee could be 
administered either at the city, regional, or state level.
e. Employee severance tax. The threat of community restructuring and 
wealth redistribution may cause some private corporations to make relocation 
plans. Other absentee corporate owners with branch plants in the city may decide 
to relocate for internal corporate reasons. Traditionally, cities have received no 
compensation for the social implications of these business relocations.
An employee severance tax would be similar to the application of a demo­
lition fee or relocation charge in the housing market. If businesses leave the com­
munity, they must pay for the impact of that loss to the local economy.
The tax should be levied on an accrual basis over the years, so that com­
panies cannot run out from under it at the time of relocation. The accrual fund 
would be used to help develop or find new jobs for employees. As the fund grows, 
the capital can also be used for community development loans.
The Coalition has included this idea in past platforms but it has not been 
formally proposed to the city council.
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B. Fee Schedules
1. Fees from tax-exempt institutions
Fee schedules on tax-exempt institutions are very important to Berkeley 
because so much city land is owned by the University of California, religious and 
non-profit charitable schools, and hospitals.
Since many of these institutions are independent corporations beyond the 
reach of normal city taxing powers, the Coalition has suggested obtaining 
revenues from these corporations where they require city services. This involves 
increased sewer charges in Berkeley, but could also be applied to water and 
garbage in other cities. These fees have been proposed by Hancock and Kelley 
but rejected by the council majority.
2. Fee for service schedules
Certain kinds of services that are paid for on a fee-for-service basis can 
have differentials applied that roughly correspond to income. Since the lower- 
income community is closer to the municipal dump than the higher-income 
community in Berkeley, when the fee is adjusted for the length of the trip, it 
becomes roughly progressive. While these fees already have a small differential, 
Hancock has proposed to the council that the differences be increased. Reiter­
ated each year since 1971, the proposals have not been accepted by the council 
majority.
A “use-correspondence” might also be applied to the fees, such as the 
number of toilets per house or sewer service charges with some basic exemption 
for family size. This, too, would be roughly progressive. It has not been officially 
proposed in Berkeley.
3. Automatic inflation increment
Fee schedules that have a progressive incidence would be periodically re­
vised to adjust for inflation so that city services can be adequately supported. 
Otherwise, the burden of support is thrown to the general fund, which in Berke­
ley’s case is derived from regressive sources.
Loni Hancock introduced a policy to this effect which was passed by the 
city council in 1971, but was not implemented. The Hancock-Kelley budget pro­
posal for 1974-75 included a three-year adjustment (25 percent increases) of 
business licenses, permits, fines and penalties, and an average 25 percent increase 
applied to make the refuse collection and sewer service fees more progressive. 
Hancock and Kelley also suggested that parking meter and off-street parking fees 
be adjusted, although not by a straight inflation factor. Only the parking 
adjustments were accepted by the council majority.
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4. Surcharges on earmarked fees
Sometimes the city is legally restricted in setting prices and allocating re­
venues that service revenue bond debt. Instead of increasing fees, a surtax can be 
levied to be used for general purposes. Surcharges on Marina berthing fees have 
been proposed in Berkeley many times but have not yet been implemented.
5. Self-support for non-essential services
Some cities own very attractive services such as summer camps—usually a 
holdover from the day when wealthy residents openly controlled city functions 
and provided subsidized services for themselves. The goal here is to move toward 
making such services self-supporting. Included in the concept of self-support 
would be internal subsidies for lower income families. City camps for families 
and children are the best example of these services in Berkeley, although they 
are not now on a self-supporting basis.
C. Existing Sources of Loan Funds
Even supposedly impoverished cities usually have savings in the form of 
budget balance (carryover), reserve, accrual and pension funds. These might be 
used as the initial capital of a revolving loan fund, or might be used for a mort­
gage insurance program similar to FHA, where the loans are secured from pri­
vate lenders. The usefulness of these funds has been raised in Berkeley in connec­
tion with a housing program proposal made by the Community Ownership 
Organizing Project and submitted to the city by Hancock and Kelley.
1. Carryover and balance funds
Balances—that is, money carried over from year to year—are by their na­
ture suited for providing short-term loans for one-time capital expenditures. 
Such loans could be made to rehabilitation and construction developers, for 
example, to cover costs before the housing obtains new permanent financing 
from the city or other sources.
2. Accrual and reserve funds
Reserve and accrual funds represent accounts set aside by the city to pay 
for specific capital improvement projects or future equipment purchases. The 
money is accumulated from year to year, prior to its use. During this otherwise 
stagnant period, reserve and accrual funds might support medium term loans. 
These might appropriately be made to housing cooperatives as early-year loans 
which are needed to cover expenses in the period before adequate income is 
produced.
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3. Pension and retirement funds
Pension funds are the most promising source for long term loans. Tradi­
tionally invested in low-yield corporate stocks and bonds, pension funds can be 
redirected to local economic development with no reduction in return or se­
curity.
The size of this capital reservoir on the state and local level is staggering. 
The California Public Employees Retirement system, which includes state em­
ployees and local employees outside the major cities and counties, has almost 
$7 billion dollars in assets. The San Francisco City and County employees retire­
ment systems have over $700 million in assets; the Oakland City employees re- 
tiremenfsystems have over $50 million. The Berkeley City employees retirement 
systems have about $7 million in assets.
Councilmembers Hancock and Kelley have continuously pushed for the 
use of the city’s pension funds as a source of loans for housing programs. The 
council majority finally set aside $500,000 for housing rehabilitation two years 
ago, but it has yet to use any appreciable amount of these funds.
D. Municipal Credit and Guarantees
Cities have the legal means to raise capital that community groups do not. 
As a result, the combination of city powers and community groups should be a 
major focus of progressive programs. Such partnerships combine the political 
intent of community groups with the institutionalized power of the cities and 
government agencies to raise capital on the money markets and use city reserves. 
Much of the high cost of borrowing capital is related to individual risk. Cities can 
effectively socialize the risk of the many kinds of loans by setting up guarantee 
funds. This should result in both access to capital and lower interest rates for 
community groups.
1. Tax-exempt bonds
The bond market functions as a mutually beneficial relationship between 
cities and wealthy investors. Municipal bonds are sold at lower interest rates than 
private bonds (the ratio of interest rates is about 2:3), allowing cities to realize 
a savings. Investors, meanwhile, do not have to pay income tax on the interest 
from the bonds, which means that the very wealthy have an incentive to buy the 
bonds as tax shelters. Although this arrangement was designed to provide tax 
breaks for the wealthy on a national level, the bonds can also be used for redis­
tributive purposes within the city.
Recently, the tightness of capital markets and the problems in New York
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have meant that municipal bonds are not receiving as favorable a rate of interest 
as traditionally associated with them. General obligation bonds are an exception 
to this, since they are securely backed by property tax money. However, unless 
repayment comes from a revenue source other than the property tax, the bonds 
have regressive effects. In California, the bonds also require approval by two- 
thirds of the electorate. Given frequent and well-justified resistance to increased 
taxes, it is very difficult to pass a new bond issue, even if  it is offered for redis­
tributive programs. The following types of bonds do not burden taxpayers di­
rectly through the property tax and therefore do not require a two-thirds vote, 
and in certain cases require no vote.
a. Revenue bonds. The revenue bond is repaid by the income from produc­
tive enterprise. It has no tie to the general taxing base of the city. It generally 
requires no election, although this depends on use of the money raised and state 
law.
The -creative use of revenue bonds can give the city relative freedom to in­
vest in profit-making enterprises. This is a common practice with respect to port 
and industrial park development, marina development, parking garages and struc­
tures, toll bridges and highways, sporting arenas and fee-supported utilities, 
where there is some guarantee of a secure flow of revenue. Often the bonds are 
used for quite traditional—and automobile oriented—investments. There are 
many other possibilities for the use of revenue bonds. The problem is that the 
major commercial banks buy and broker these bonds. It is not clear the extent 
to which a relatively radical departure in their use will be acceptable to these 
banks.
In general, however, the investing community has been eager to have cities 
expand their use of revenue bonds. Bond brokers, for instance, have been among 
the most encouraging representatives of the financial community with regard to 
proposals for city-financed cable television.
Enabling legislation in California now allows revenue bonds to be used for 
housing construction and rehabilitation of existing housing. Charter cities have 
not only their implied home-rule powers, but also state-enabling legislation that 
specifically allows them to finance housing. The legislature has also recently 
established state guarantees for the issuance of these bonds and related mort­
gages, effectively placing some of the state’s credit behind local housing finance 
programs. In the 1975 election, BCA candidates included this technique in the 
housing/employment program they proposed for Berkeley.
b. Lease-back arrangements. The lease-back is usually regarded as a form of 
revenue bond, but is really guaranteed by city taxes. The city, or public agency,
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writes a contract to pay long-term lease payments on a facility, such as a garage 
or a cable television system. The lease payment is guaranteed by the general 
revenues of the city, which is basically tax money. This is a contractual arrange­
ment that continues for the term of the bond, and is paid every year at the 
amount of the debt service for the bond. Issuance of these bonds does not 
require an election in California. They are considered much more secure than 
revenue bonds, and can actually be used for certain facilities that are not revenue 
producing. For example, it is conceivable to build a new school or city hall using 
a lease-back arrangement. This arrangement has only been discussed in general 
by members of the Coalition and has not yet been part of any formal proposal.
c. Non-profit corporation bonds. These are essentially revenue bonds used 
for an income-producing enterprise that is technically owned by a private, non­
profit corporation set up by a public agency. This technique has been used for 
a city-owned parking garage and commercial building in Berkeley, but has not 
been proposed as a part of any community-related program.
d. Industrial development bonds. These are another alternative for funding 
city-owned enterprise. They are a form of revenue bond that can be used to di­
rectly benefit private businesses but are limited in the amount of capital that 
can be raised.
e. Assessment district bonds. These are a form of local area property tax 
bond, used conventionally for streets, sewer drainage and water systems. The 
property-owners who directly benefit from an improvement are assessed a spe­
cial tax rate to pay for that improvement. These can generally be issued without 
a vote by a public agency unless there is 50 percent opposition by the property 
owners. So far, there have been no specific proposals in Berkeley that make use 
of this technique.
2. Tax increment district financing
The tax increment district allows property taxes on the increases in 
assessed value in a redevelopment district to be returned to the redevelopment 
agency to pay off loans and bonds. In effect, district improvements are financed 
by the increased tax revenues generated in the district.
In Berkeley, tax increment financing is currently included in the official 
proposal to finance low-to-moderate income cooperative housing for the Savo 
Island Project. The Savo Island housing may also be considered as relocation 
housing for the industrial park development, and as such may use tax increment 
funds from the industrial park.
The potential benefit of this complicated financing arrangement is that 
cooperative housing for lower income people can be financed out of industrial
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property taxes, as well as the taxes on the housing itself. As a result, housing 
costs will be much lower than they would otherwise be in the housing market, 
incomes will be accommodated.
Possible uses of tax increment financing include land write-downs and 
improvements, housing rehabilitation, relocation, transit facilities, park develop­
ment, and other public and community facilities. In California tax increment 
revenues might also be used for services related to the district and its purposes, 
such as drug rehabilitation programs.
3. Tax-exempt bank loans
As with bonds, the interest paid on bank loans by local government is 
exempt from income taxes. If the city borrows and then lends the money to 
non-profit corporations (including cooperatives) within the city, it is essentially 
passing on its lower interest rates. This can support such functions as housing 
rehabilitation, and has been proposed in conjunction with rehabilitation pro­
grams in Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco. Instead of issuing bonds on the 
open market, cities negotiate the loans with a bank. Because much of the 
technical aspects of bond issuance can be avoided, tax-exempt bank loans should 
have a lower interest rate than municipal bond issues. Cities should be wary, 
however, of high administrative costs charged by the banks.
4. Local tax-exempt savings bond program
Small denomination bonds can be issued and sold locally to city residents. 
The interest would be circulated locally, and the city would not be dependent 
upon a large financial institution to buy the bonds.
This program does not reach very low-income people, but it brings tax 
exemption within the reach of moderate-income community residents. It also 
moves a city in the direction of a city banking function.
Such a savings bond program would be particularly useful in Berkeley be­
cause of the very high savings account deposits in the city. It is one way of cap­
turing the use of individual and small business capital for use by the local com­
munity.
5. Deposit leverage
The city can demand desired activities from banks holding its deposits, 
both on a policy and financial level. As a condition for continued deposit of its 
funds, the city can demand policy changes ranging from affirmative action on 
minority hiring and the halt of “red-lining” practices to basic standards for cor­
porate investment. Cities can also call for the use of funds for rehabilitation 
loans or loans to small community businesses in exchange for continued deposits.
57
The City of Berkeley and the Berkeley School District have an annual cash 
flow of approximately $100 million, which could translate into significant 
influence over the recipient banks. Even more important for the economic 
development of the city, the annual cash flow and the existing $10-15 million in 
long-term deposits could provide the necessary capital for starting a community 
bank.
6. Credit Union
Berkeley has a municipal credit union for public employees, and a credit 
union associated with the Consumers’ Cooperative of Berkeley. The city itself 
could look toward establishing a community-wide credit union as an initial step 
in building a full banking function.
7. Public assets
Loan guarantees can be developed by public cash deposited in the bank. 
These assets can be leveraged on approximately a one to five ratio for long-term 
borrowing on mortgages, real estate, and bonds. As deposits approach $1 million 
or more, the leverage can be increased up to ten times.
Furthermore, guarantees are often only necessary for the top 20 to 25 
percent of the mortgage or bonds. This can increase the leverage effect even 
further.
For example, $1 million in public bank deposits might guarantee a loan of 
$10 million. The $10 million might cover only the top 20 to 25 percent of the 
bonds or mortgages. This may allow a bond issue of $50 million. So for $1 
million, leverage could increase capital 50 times. Of course, the interest on this 
money must still be paid at the going rate.
In addition to cash assets, the city also might own substantial property 
that can be put up as collateral for loans.
Cash deposits for guarantees and leveraging using Community Develop­
ment Revenue Sharing funds are included as part of housing rehabilitation 
programs which are moving towards implementation in Berkeley, Oakland, and 
San Francisco.
E. Budget Reform
The city of Berkeley controls a $50 million annual budget. Coalition 
councilmembers have not only been critical of the regressivity of the tax sources 
of this money, but also have attempted to correct expenditures which reinforce 
rather than rectify income disparities among residents. For its trouble, the Coali­
tion learned that direct control of the city budget cannot be gained by a mi­
nority of the council.
However, Coalition councilmembers have exposed budgetary atrocities and
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excesses, and have gained occasional concessions from the majority. There has 
been some progress since 1971, when councilmembers had to fight to receive 
line item budget documents. For instance, budget priorities skewed in favor of 
police hardware and automobile-related facilites have been successfully chal­
lenged. The following techniques have been used by progressive councilmembers 
and their volunteer staffs to influence the city budget:
1. Citizen audit of the departmental requests
The Coalition began its efforts at budget reform with a complete counter- 
budget in 1971, virtually a line item alternative to the city manager’s recom­
mended budget. Although the council did not accept most of the recommended 
changes (other than those items which helped the majority forestall a property 
tax increase and initiate a few social programs), the citizens’ work gave the city 
bureaucracy a much needed jolt.
For the past two years, the council majority has presented its budget 
package at the eleventh hour, passing it without prior public discussion. This 
year, members of the council majority have felt the need to set up their own 
citizens budget committee. However, they have resisted efforts to establish such 
a citizens group as an official committee which would represent all council- 
members.
Increased access to the budget process through the new Coalition- 
supported city auditor will be possible during the next four years. Members of 
the auditor’s advisory committee are hoping to obtain information about city 
contracts in order to plug some of the capital flow leaks. For instance, the city 
could renegotiate the contract with PG&E for all gas and electric service, rather 
than continuing the present system of having a separate meter for virtually every 
traffic and street light, each recording the highest rate for electricity.
A council majority of progressives could go well beyond these reforms. 
The city budget could be analyzed by program rather than by line item, and 
begin from “ground zero” rather than with justification required only for budget 
increases. The entire budget of a department could be evaluated according to 
cost-effectiveness criteria. Distributional impact analysis, comparable to environ­
mental impact analyses, needs to be performed on city programs. Neighborhood 
budgeting, or decentralizing major sections of the city budget, is also a concept 
that has been proposed in Berkeley.
2. Salary ratio enforcement
Salaries often present a difficult problem for city finance, particularly in 
administrations that have strong union backing and are (as they should be) pro­
union. Decent and increasing salaries for working people are absolutely necessary
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for any progressive administration. The problem is how to keep the wage bill from 
getting out of hand in terms of the total limitations on city finances.
All problems of wage levels and working conditions for city workers begin 
from the fundamental economic antagonism between city government and its 
employees. City councilmembers, no matter how progressive or “radical” in 
intent, tend to assume a management position with regard to the municipal 
unions. Short of worker control of the city, solutions must be worked out 
through direct consultation with those workers, who should be among the consti­
tuency of progressive councilmembers.
The salary ratio enforcement concept means the city can set as its 
objective a maximum ratio of three to one between the salaries of the highest 
paid and the lowest paid city staff. It can move in that direction in a variety of 
ways: greater increases at lower levels, no increases at upper levels, maximum 
salaries which no one can pass, and equal dollar increases for all so that the 
bottom moves up more rapidly as a percentage of the top.
Following the lead of progressive councilmembers, in 1972 the full council 
agreed to give city workers salary increases in equal amounts rather than in per­
centage increments based on current salaries. When the council majority realized 
what it had done, it immediately called a special meeting, early on a Saturday 
morning, to reverse the decision. More recently, some salary increases in equal 
dollar amounts have been granted.
3. Use of earmarked external funds for general fund operating expenses
State and federal funds that must be spent for specified services should not 
be spent for programs that run counter to local priorities. For example, gas tax 
money could be used for street lighting or bike lanes rather than street widening.
It is also possible to use parking lot revenues which must be spent on park­
ing-related functions to pay for police or other city services associated with the 
lots and garages in lieu of general fund sources. Increased parking revenues in 
Berkeley are otherwise channeled into faster debt service by revenue bond reg­
ulations.
A certain pro-rated percentage of Marina revenues could also be channeled 
into the general fund to pay for street and utility maintenance related to the 
Marina, or the money could be used to help provide transit access to the 
facilities. All Marina revenues are now earmarked for activities, development or 
debt service associated with the Marina.
F. State and Federal Grants
Berkeley is not unique in seeking and receiving federal and state sources of 
capital. Block grants, in particular, can be spent creatively, and should be con-
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trolled by representatives of the affected communities.
To advise on allocation of its Community Development Revenue Sharing 
Funds, the Berkeley City Council set up a citizens’ advisory board. The CDRS 
Board in Berkeley consisted of representatives of the previous Model Cities 
Board, delegates from neighborhood organizations (chosen by the neighborhood), 
representatives from social service and other community issue groups, and repre­
sentatives from certain boards and commissions. They requested, but were 
denied, a double-green light agreement with the council. Lacking that agreement, 
public control over revenue-sharing funds was limited to ineffective neighbor­
hood pressure for using the money to benefit lower income communities rather 
than expand the city hall bureaucracy.
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V il. THE CITY AS EMPLOYER
The election of three city council members and the city auditor has forced 
Berkeley progressives to realize that gaining control over city government will 
thrust them into the role of manager and employer. If the programs we have des­
cribed are implemented, new jobs will be generated in housing, utilities and other 
community enterprises. But, in addition, Berkeley progressives will inherit 
responsibility for the city’s bureaucracy.
A. Support for Public Employees
Elected radicals, like all other city councilmembers, must sit on the boss 
side of the bargaining table with city employees. The council must balance de­
mands for salary and benefit increases with limited city revenues. This can be an 
unnerving experience for people whose political stance has traditionally included 
unquestioning support of labor unions.
Goaded by the organized demands of city workers, a critical budget squeeze, 
and citizen demands for a less costly and more responsive bureaucracy, progres­
sive Berkeley councilmembers have been cautiously moving toward a city labor 
policy that is both supportive of employees and independent of protective craft 
unions.
At the same time, the BCA Coalition realizes that it is extremely impor­
tant to maintain a fundamental alliance with public employees. Government 
workers are presently subject to widespread public anger for supposed feather­
bedding, fat salaries, undeserved job security and generous pensions. They are 
being held up by the nation’s press as the primary factor in the fiscal crisis of the 
cities.
And yet public employees, along with migrant workers, are without benefit 
of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. Only 14 states have comprehensive 
laws authorizing broadscope collective bargaining for both state and local govern­
ment employees. Fourteen other states offer limited negotiation or consultation 
in some form to some public employees, but not to others. Eight additional 
states offer bargaining rights just to teachers. In the remaining states, public em­
ployees have no legislated right to bargain. And in virtually all states, the right of 
public employees to strike is severely limited.
Good retirement systems and job security have traditionally been trade­
offs that governments offered—and employees accepted—in exchange for wages 
and salaries lower than those prevailing for comparable work in the private sector. 
The trade-offs were made primarily because local government found it easier to 
grant benefits to their employees that had no immediate impact on the taxpayer
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or the city budget.
But that contract is breaking down. Public employees are finding that their 
real incomes are declining, their pension funds have been poorly invested in low- 
yield bonds, and their vaunted job security has disappeared with the onset of 
critical urban financial crises. At the same time, a society whose entire work 
force has had restricted productivity is in the process of applying selective pres­
sure to public employees. Until public employees have gained bargaining proce­
dures, the right to strike, and an adequate grievance procedure, they should not 
be singled out for structural reforms that have long been resisted by more 
established trade unions. The following proposals for changes in city employee 
policies are presented with this caveat.
B. Wage Differentials
Left coalitions in Berkeley have stressed long-range solutions—retention 
and expansion of the city’s wealth—to enable a progressive city council to pay its 
employees properly and provide necessary social services. Aside from Coalition 
proposals for progressive taxation, however, this long-range position ignores the 
immediate gap between city revenues and projected expenses.
A reordering of city employees’ wage structure has come to represent the 
Coalition’s short-range approach to the interrelated problems of the budget 
crunch, high inflation and the general assault on public employees. In the period 
before innovative city enterprises capture and expand city wealth significantly, 
the real wages of lower paid city workers can be maintained and improved by a 
policy that would narrow the pay differential between higher and lower paid 
city staff.
The traditional wage increase negotiated by Berkeley city unions called for 
a straight percentage increase for all employees from the lowest to the highest 
paid. Public support for these wage increases, especially among progressive resi­
dents, was based on support for the lower paid employees. The fact that the 
highly-paid employees at managerial and professional level positions benefited 
from this support for labor was not a critical issue so long as the city seemed 
able to support the costs.
In any event, city unions did not challenge such across-the-board increases 
until this year. Many of the unions have, furthermore, neglected the job of organ­
izing people in the lowest paid categories. They have achieved the most growth 
among higher paid and professional workers. Thus, the impetus to restructure 
wage categories has not originated from the unions representing city employees.
Berkeley’s left Coalition has been understandably wary of this issue, afraid 
of undermining trade unions now under attack from the business community.
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But the Coalition realized that the credibility of progressive councilmembers will 
be continuously challenged if they effectively place the needs of low-income city 
employees in direct competition with the needs of low-income residents.
As a result, Councilmembers Hancock and Kelley proposed that pay in­
creases be given in equal absolute amounts rather than as across-the-board per­
centage increases. The measure was rejected in 1973.
In 1975, however, the unions themselves proposed and won a combination 
of absolute amount and percentage wage increases. According to one local labor 
official, the push for this more equitable formula came from lower paid workers 
recently included in the unions.
C. The City Bureaucracy
Not only must expenditures for salaries be reallocated, but the hierarchical 
bureaucracy also needs reorganization. Long-range political and efficiency consid­
erations demand that more collective forms of decision-making be adopted. In­
fighting at the upper levels and alienating work conditions at the lower levels are 
among the non-productive characteristics of highly stratified bureaucracies that 
defy improvement without structural change. The streamlining of bureaucratic 
functions and reassignment of the city’s work force must occur if new programs 
are to be implemented without aggravating the problem of a swollen bureauc­
racy. Active support is needed from the employees who will have the job of 
making the programs work on a day-to-day basis. Employees unwilling to work 
will be a liability.
But in a hierarchical setting, city employees at almost all levels must insist 
on retaining the high level of security typical of civil service. They realistically 
fear that if lay-offs were to be regulated by any standard other than the pre­
scribed one of seniority, decisions of who goes and who stays would reflect 
favoritism for employees who are ingratiating and who accommodate their 
superiors.
There are obviously no quick and easy solutions that will instantaneously 
produce a wholly dedicated city staff. While hierarchical work relationships are 
responsible for much non-productive work behavior, collective decision-making 
imposed from above by a well-meaning city council can only add a baroque twist 
to the problems.
D. Changing the City Manager Form  
of Government
The April Coalition and BCA platforms have consistently opposed the city 
manager form of municipal government. The official myth that the city manager
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Dmvides “scientific” and “objective” administration is belied by the performance 
of successive city managers in Berkeley.
Part of the city manager’s role has been to create the appearance that the 
council majority rejects redistributive programs for technical considerations 
rather than political disagreement. As the top figure of the bureaucratic pyramid, 
the city manager also marshalls support for council programs among the city 
staff. The department heads and their assistants reflect hi's outlook.
E. New Jobs
Many of the new jobs generated will be in cooperative and other forms of 
community ownership separate from the city bureaucracy. To the extent that 
public financing and support is provided to these enterprises, the city will be 
able to mandate employment policies. From the outset, ethnic, racial and gender 
balance can be implemented. Wage differentials between highest and lowest paid 
employees can be reduced. Work schedules can be arranged to meet employee 
needs; a division of labor can be designed that allows employees to understand 
how their work fits into some final product and take pride in their contribution. 
Finally, lines of control can be developed stressing cooperation rather than 
competition.
Designing new organizational structures will initially absorb time and atten­
tion, and must be viewed as an investment in future productivity. Fortunately, 
there has already been extensive experimentation with collective work rela­
tionships by a variety of Berkeley organizations and enterprises, including food 
stores, restaurants, retail stores, a radio station, a newspaper and community ser­
vices. Out of these attempts to structure equitable and productive non-hierarchical 
work relationships, there exists a pool of experience that new community enter­
prises can draw on.
F. The Auditor’s Department
The impact of Florence McDonald on the Auditor’s Department demon­
strates that interaction between a progressive “boss” and city employees can pro­
duce significant change. Immediately after taking office in 1975, McDonald re­
quested a salary cut of more than $8,000 to make her salary equivalent to that 
of the next highest paid worker in her department.
Within the first month, McDonald had significantly improved working con­
ditions by eliminating make-work tasks and irritating regulations that were 
designed for employee control rather than productivity. She also allowed flexi­
bility in work arrangements, permitting a new mother to work part-time, for 
instance.
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Subsequently, Berkeley’s new auditor initiated department reorganization 
that will allow employees to gain an idea of the department’s work as a whole 
and understand how their work fits in. To fill a vacant supervisorial position, 
McDonald suggested that interested employees could learn new tasks and assume 
increased responsibility on the job to become eligible for the promotion.
Employees in turn have responded by sharing information with their new 
department head. This is not a trivial consideration, since the previous auditor 
refused to provide an orderly transition of authority, and two of her top assistants 
retired within three months of McDonald’s taking office. Many members of the 
new auditor’s staff have helped redefine procedures, and otherwise assumed the 
initiative that public employees are supposed to lack.
McDonald has also implemented changes that reach beyond her own depart­
ment. She has provided basic humane changes in the city’s wage garnishment 
system, a state-required process by which the city collects debts owed to private 
creditors by city employees. McDonald has eliminated humiliating procedures 
and reduced the amounts garnished. Under the previous auditor, more money 
was removed from employees’ checks than was legally required because the 
clerks were using an obsolete formula. McDonald has also provided employees 
with information on how to avoid garnishment entirely.
As great as McDonald’s impact has been, significant reorganization of the 
city bureaucracy clearly must await a council committed to non-hierarchical struc­
ture, and replacement of the city manager form of local government. In the in­
terim, however, it is necessary to enact reforms that will prepare ground for the 
more comprehensive changes. The following three programs are among the most 
important supported by the progressive council minority.
G. Interim Programs
1. Affirmative Action requirements
The city of Berkeley’s Affirmative Action program seeks to include ethnic 
minorities and women at all municipal job levels in the same proportion they 
represent in the city population. To achieve this objective, hiring policies favored 
qualified applicants from groups who were effectively barred from particular job 
categories in the past.
A recent court decision has immobilized the program by disallowing the 
preferences. During the time that the program was in effect, however, selective in­
roads were made. The historic exclusion of Black men from professional and 
management level positions has been reversed. Unfortunately, women of all races 
have not gained comparably from the program.
The most immediate effect of an affirmative action program is that a few
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people will get jobs that they would previously have been unfairly denied. More 
importantly from the city’s point of view, acceptance of a formula requiring a 
representative city bureaucracy institutionalizes fairness criteria. It provides a 
necessary pre-condition for the more sweeping changes needed to restructure the 
bureaucracy.
It is obvious that affirmative action by itself does not accomplish this re­
structuring. Decreasing the power of high level bureaucrats will evoke racially 
and sexually integrated resistance when those positions have only recently been 
occupied by members of minority groups and/or women. Loyalty to the hierar­
chical organization can be expected to cross ethnic, racial and gender lines if 
affirmative action has been successfully implemented in the higher levels of the 
bureaucracy.
Fortunately, support for democratizing the bureaucracy will also come 
from all quarters. Increased relative pay, status, and authority of people in the 
lower levels of the hierarchy will also cut across racial, ethnic and gender divi­
sions. No matter how top heavy the bureaucracy, there are necessarily more 
people at the bottom of the bureaucratic pyramid than there are at the top.
The recent school strike in Berkeley has shown that effective affirmative 
action policies provide an environment where racial difference becomes a neutral 
factor in a struggle over bureaucratic structure and working conditions. A 
school administration whose highest positions are filled by Third World people 
proposed to meet a budget deficit by reducing teacher salaries and fringe bene­
fits, and by increasing class sizes. The teaching staff, more than a third of whom 
are Third World people, responded with a strike demanding that the deficit be 
made up instead by reducing administrative costs. The strike was more than 90 
percent effective before the teachers agreed to return to work pending a study of 
the school budget.
The more successful the affirmative action program is in creating a repre­
sentative employee profile at all levels of the city staff, the more likely that the 
conflict over basic restructuring will focus on the critical issue of eliminating 
disparities of power and wealth, rather than on racial and sexual divisions. 
Strong affirmative action policies can prevent a clouding of the important 
issues. Political power is not possible for progressive coalitions without the 
unified and active support and cooperation of diverse communities with gener­
ally common economic interests.
2. Residency requirements
The April Coalition attempted to set city residency requirements for po­
lice by aminitiative measure in 1973. The proposal would have required police to
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live in the part of the city they served. The measure failed by a 48 percent to 
52 percent vote.
Without those requirements, 80 percent of the city’s police and 86 percent 
of its firemen live in nearby suburbs. When surveyed for reasons, many indicated 
a distaste for the integrated school system and radical image of Berkeley.
Generally the courts have upheld residency requirements for police and 
firemen, while they have split on the legality of residency requirements for 
other employees which may interfere with the constitutional “right to travel.” 
Some states, including California, have recently banned residency requirements 
for all public employees.
The residency requirement is very important to restructuring and stimulat­
ing the local economy. City employees who also live in Berkeley will spend more 
money in the city, will have a local residence, and will ultimately contribute 
more to the local circulation of dollars.
If the city has a coordinated full employment program, clear economic 
benefits for the community result from a residency requirement. First pre­
ference for all jobs would go to residents .of the city. Clear political benefits 
would also result, as patronage is spread to virtually the entire city. The danger 
here is encouragement of a ‘beggar your neighbor’ policy, which would adversely 
affect low- and middle-income Oakland and Richmond residents.
3. Job restructuring
In 1971 Loni Hancock introduced a proposal to the city council which 
would have provided city employees the option of working part-time for 
pro-rated pay and fringe benefits.20 Part-time employees would have been able 
to work part of each day, several days per week, or six months on and six 
months off. The program included opportunities for job sharing, enabling two 
people to hold one position, splitting hours and work loads according to their 
needs.
This policy would have helped to increase the number of employment 
opportunities, and reinforce opportunities for the handicapped, the elderly, 
students and other marginal members of the labor force. Preliminary experience 
indicates that productivity increases when part-time work options are provided, 
although it is unclear whether or not the higher productivity would continue if 
shorter hours were a more prevalent pattern.
The proposed Berkeley program would have applied to all categories of 
city work except those exempted by a special monitoring committee. The pro­
gram, however, would affect a maximum of 20 percent of all city jobs in order 
to protect those not wishing to work on a part-time basis. This provision was in­
cluded to protect minority and single-parent heads of families who require the 
income from full-time employment.
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The city council has endorsed the program in principle, but it is not 
committed to a program or enforcement of the options. Implementation of job 
restructuring is at the discretion of department heads, who have on the whole 
ignored the council principles.
Resistance to job restructuring has been especially strong from higher level 
bureaucrats. They have not only withheld the option from employees, but also 




Local community control and ownership of transportation facilities could 
offer the public the opportunity to decide how to distribute transportation costs 
and benefits. As with housing, utilities, health care, banking and other necessary 
urban functions, private control of transportation has traditionally required 
lower income people to pay more than they can afford, while their basic needs 
go unmet.
Transportation in Berkeley is currently a typical illustration of combined 
public and private ownership. Transportation profits, which result from wide 
dependence on the automobile, are the private property of automobile, fuel and 
related companies. The support system (highways, traffic control, for example) 
for the automobile and the unprofitable supplementary modes of transportation 
(mass transit, for example) are public responsibilities. This split has not only pre­
vented equitable allocation of total transportation costs and benefits, but also 
has reinforced the attractiveness of the private automobile to the public by 
shielding its true costs.
There are countless hidden costs associated with the private car-the 
“free” parking offered by a supermarket, the local property tax rate reflecting 
the tax-exempt 40 to 60 percent of the city’s surface area devoted to auto­
mobile-related uses, half the local police department budget that is ordinarily 
spent on automobile-related functions, the deaths from respiratory ailments 
attributable to automobile exhaust, and the carnage from accidents. These costs 
are paid even by people who cannot afford the thousands of dollars yearly that 
it costs to buy, fuel, insure, repair and maintain a car. Yet the city’s pattern of 
development virtually requires people to have cars for mobility.
In Berkeley, as in much of the Bay Area and California, public transpor­
tation has deteriorated seriously in the last 50 years. Berkeley residents in the 
1920s could travel by train and ferry to San Francisco in less time than it now 
takes using the new billion dollar rapid transit system that does not even operate 
at night or on weekends.
It isn’t likely that public transit facilities can be revived to previous levels 
of service through the application of local programs. Responsibilities for trans­
portation function, like the trips that people make, are not local. The Bay Area 
Rapid Transit district consists of three counties. The district that operates the 
buses in Berkeley is comprised of two counties. Highways are planned by the 
state and by a nine-county regional agency.
Despite the institutional impediments to local control over the trans­
portation function, transportatiôn issues in Berkeley have evoked consistent and 
active grassroots participation. Beginning in the early 1970s, neighborhoods 
began resisting further street development. Efforts of the city staff to have two
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east-west city streets widened from two lanes to six have been permanently 
shelved. Two-lane neighborhood city streets that had been converted for one­
way traffic to accommodate increased traffic volumes were reconverted to 
two-way traffic following a series of street demonstrations.
Indeed, one of the few budget reforms initially proposed by Loni Hancock 
to be accepted by the city council majority redirected the local share of highway 
trust funds from road improvements to street lights and maintenance.
A. The Neighborhood Traffic Study
The city’s major response to the popular demand for reduced traffic has 
been the Neighborhood Traffic Study. This official city project involved people 
from every neighborhood in the city in meetings where they proposed traffic 
controls—traffic barriers and diverters, stop signs and a few traffic lights—for 
intersections in their own neighborhoods. The goal has been to discourage traffic 
within residential neighborhoods by diverting “through” traffic onto arterial 
streets.
The resulting plan, implemented in the summer of 1975, has been a vivid 
illustration of the limitations of a regulatory response to structural problems. 
Traffic on some streets has slowed, motorists have rerouted some of their trips, 
and the elderly and children can now cross certain streets with a sense of 
security. There is no sign, however, that traffic has decreased. To be sure, during 
the time that the Neighborhood Traffic Study has been under way, the council 
majority has approved use permits for several hundred new off-street parking 
spaces that will generate thousands of additional automobile trips each day.
B. The Coordinated Transit Study
Conceived as a complement to the Neighborhood Traffic Study, the 
Coordinated Transit Study was organized by the city staff to define improve­
ments in public transit facilities within Berkeley. Theoretically, transit accessi­
bility would be improved as automobile disincentives were introduced and 
people would make trips within the city by bus rather than by car.
This study group, involving five government agencies in addition to the 
city, is proposing a grid pattern of bus service with dramatically improved 
headways. Its proposed plan would allow people to travel from any point in the 
city to any other using just two buses, with only short waits for the buses even 
in non-peak hours. Currently bus service is designed primarily to link selected 
points in Berkeley with downtown Oakland.
The Transit Study also provides for the special needs of the disabled and 
elderly—groups that require door-to-door transportation service. It calls for a 
dial-a-ride service to meet these special needs, using a fleet of vehicles equipped 
to carry wheelchairs.
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Although the study has not yet been completed, it appears unlikely that 
the system of improvements will be implemented in the near future. Financing 
the additional costs raises questions that are only partly within the powers of 
the city to answer. Clearly the strong political support within the city in favor of 
a shift from the private automobile to public transit is diluted at the regional 
level. While the main contribution of the Transit Study may turn out to be pres­
sure on regional transit agencies for more locally responsive service, those 
reforms hardly qualify as structural. The fragmentation of authority and funds 
for transit in the Berkeley setting seems to prevent any immediate significant- 
movement towards community control of the transportation function.
C. Economic Disincentives to the Automobile
Taxes that discourage automobile travel and simultaneously provide for 
cheaper, or preferably free, transit trips can be an important step in an over-all 
transportation program. The examples that follow were proposed in conjunction 
with Berkeley’s Coordinated Transit Study. These taxes should be applied only 
where quick and convenient public transit becomes available to substitute for 
the automobile. The revenue they generate should be used to finance public 
transit, but should not be viewed as its major source of support. The primary 
goal of these taxes is to discourage people from making trips by car.
1. Tax on off-street parking with in lieu fare payment
This tax would apply to public and private owners of off-street parking 
lots. In Berkeley, almost all off-street parking is provided by merchants, em­
ployers, and professionals as subsidies for the auto travel of their respective 
patrons, employees and clients. The parking is ordinarily provided at little or 
no cost, sometimes by means of a validation system. The largest employers in 
Berkeley—the city itself and the university—currently provide these spaces for 
their highest paid employees.
A tax on off-street parking spaces should be designed to provide the same 
subsidy for patrons, employees and clients who take the bus. The owner of the 
parking facility would pay the tax based on the number of spaces, with the 
money going to a transit fund.
In lieu of the tax payments, the owner could purchase bus tokens for dis­
tribution to customers or employees. The result would be free fares for those 
who travel by bus.
This tax should also anticipate the gradual conversion of parking lots to 
other purposes. The city might develop a program that would allow for the land
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retrieved from parking to be included in a public land banking or open space 
system.
2. Tying parking meter rates to transit fares
As in most other places, the cost of an hour’s metered on-street parking in 
Berkeley is much less than round trip bus fare. Equalizing these two charges 
would tend to increase use of public transit, possibly driving down fares. At the 
same time, the increased parking fees would not be a great added burden on 
people who continue to drive.
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IX. SOCIAL SERVICES
The most apparent success gained by progressive participation on the City 
Council is city funding of community-based service organizations. From 1969 to 
the present, councilmembers Hancock, Kelley, Denton, and Supervisor Tom 
Bates at the county level have won some funding for a broad range of alternative 
health and service organizations that serve the city’s low-income, counterculture, 
minority, women, disabled and transient clients.
Coalition support for these services has been based on the need to bring 
the level and quality of services available to poor and minority people closer to 
that available to wealthier residents. Direct public subsidy is necessary to deliver 
these services—if they were lucrative sources of professional fees, the services 
would have been provided by the private sector long ago.
Coalition success in securing funding for community-based services, how­
ever, has been more apparent than real. Each year the Coalition councilmembers 
have tied adequate support for social services to specific revenue-creating pro­
grams, and each year the connecting link has been broken by the council ma­
jority. The progressive minority has been able to goad the council into providing 
support for popular community services, but the majority refuses to cut into 
local business profits or high administrative salaries to adequately fund the 
programs.
Faced with this intransigence, the Coalition councilmembers have backed 
up their funding proposals with specific budget-trimming recommendations. 
Initially, councilmember Hancock raided the large unallocated reserve and emer­
gency funds of the city manager and the department heads. Then she attacked 
the less apparent discretionary caches, such as annual budget balances. Hancock, 
Kelley and Denton later caught budget “errors” , including projected revenues 
that did not account for inflation, and bureaucratic waste found within the city 
departments. While the council majority has not acted on all of these sugges­
tions, it has acceded to enough of them to ensure partial funding of the com­
munity services without an increase in property taxes.
Unfortunately, budget sleuthing to provide funds for community services 
is only a short range strategy. Each example of waste in the city budget can only 
be raided once. Furthermore, the council majority has substituted general direc­
tives to cut departmental budgets for specific cuts proposed by the Coalition 
councilmembers. Department heads have ordinarily responded.by cutting ser­
vices to the public rather than trimming their overhead budgets. Clearly, the 
time is approaching when community service organizations, their clients, the 
council and city residents must confront the uncomfortable fact that service
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programs for the poor must be tied to revenue sources. The slack in the city 
budget that allowed Berkeley citizens to avoid this economic truism is fast 
disappearing.
The staffs of many of the community service organizations have been 
quick to grasp the inadequacy of the city’s funding. Services are frequently 
provided by volunteers working together with a handful of staff members who 
are paid poverty-level salaries. Without the massive subsidy represented by this 
almost free labor, few of the community services could have been started or 
maintained. This survival requirement has an ironic twist; the poorer a group of 
people, the more difficult for them to provide this internal subsidy. Not sur­
prisingly, minority communities can least afford to work without pay.
A. Available Services
Despite the inadequacy of council support, community-based social ser­
vices have flourished in number, variety and quality over the past few years.
The Berkeley Free Clinic, organized during the Telegraph Avenue riots of 
1968, was a forerunner and in many respects a prototype of the groups that now 
serve the needs of thousands of low income Berkeley residents and young trav­
elers every year. The clinic was founded by young people who were alienated 
from conventional public health facilities. Community people worked with 
sympathetic professionals to organize an environment that would be accepting, 
supportive and competent to deal with the health problems of the counter- 
cultural clients. The initial crisis orientation of the clinic has given way to 
broader concerns for meeting day-to-day health needs.
Since 1968, members of other sub-cultures in Berkeley have similarly 
organized services to respond to the specific needs of their communities. In addi­
tion to alternative health services, organizations have sprung up to assist people 
with economic, social, legal and physical needs. Black, Asian, Latino, feminist, 
disabled and elderly groups have provided a broad range of services, often on 
shoestring budgets.
A number of the agencies realized they could easily fall into squabbling 
with one another for the crumbs. To avoid this, they formed a coalition during 
the 1974 budget hearings called the Community Services United (which now 
also includes organizations that do not request city funds). Community Services 
United presented a joint funding proposal to the council, and persuaded the 
majority to budget almost 50% more for alternative community services than the 
city manager had recommended.
In the summer of 1975, Black community organizations applying for 
grants from the city similarly decided to approach the council as a bloc. The
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groups are now incorporated as United Coalition for Project Upgrade, with the 
director of the Bay Area Association of Household Technicians as president.
To avoid further competition between service groups for city funds, Com­
munity Services United and Project Upgrade presented a joint funding proposal 
to the city council in 1975.
In addition to Community Services United and Project Upgrade, there are 
informal networks of Asian and Latino organizations. Berkeley’s Asian-American 
community has organized special community services to meet needs that conven­
tional health, educational, employment, and welfare groups have not been able to 
provide. Traditional agencies could not deliver services effectively because they 
were often unable to communicate in the language and were insensitive to the 
cultural differences of the city’s Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean and Samoan 
residents.
The number of Latino service organizations has also grown following the 
founding of Casa de la Raza, a bi-lingual, bi-cultural school that operated in the 
Berkeley School System from 1971 to 1973. A coalition among some of the 
school-related programs has been established.
These groups, and others, have developed a wide range of services for 
themselves. People can receive health care, shelter and food, residential care, 
counselling and advocacy assistance, programs for children and for the elderly, 
employment and training from other people who share their background, 
language and values. Specific services range from dental care to apprenticeships 
in accounting, sound staging, theatre and feminist law. Included are halfway 
houses, free hot meals, immigration counselling, interpreting services, tenant 
workshops, recreation programs for ex-offenders and their families, facilities for 
legal self-help, development of bi-lingual teaching materials, social security assis­
tance, and wheelchair repairs.
B. Gaps in Publicly Provided Services
The variety and number of Berkeley’s alternative services is an indication 
of the gaps that exist in the services provided by public agencies. The Centro de 
Salud would not have developed if outpatient care had been available to the 
city’s Latinos that was adequate to their needs, respectful of their sensibilities, 
and affordable. With only a minority of the council to advocate their needs, dif­
ferent groups in the community have been able to gain some public resources to 
partially match their own efforts, but they have not been strong enough to force 
the city departments to meet their special needs as a matter of course.
The prospect of progressive control of the council raises the possibility of 
incorporating the strengths of the community services into public agencies. For
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example, the council might set a policy for the city to provide the services now 
offered by the Bay Area Coalition of Koreans, which helps provide interpreter 
service at court hearings. Municipal government is in a position, as a group that 
depends on contributions is not, to connect such a program to a secure and 
equitable source of financial support. As part of a public program, these services 
would be continuously maintained. In community groups, on the other hand, 
the continuation of a program often depends on the availability and interest 
of a few very dedicated people.
C. Institutionalizing the Strengths of CSO’s
Community service organizations can provide alternative models for ser­
vice delivery. As community services are absorbed into a public framework, it is 
critical that their advantages be reinforced. While specifics vary from service to 
service, and from subculture to subculture, the services have demonstrated the 
usefulness of several work patterns.
1. Services provided by non-professionals
In general the community service organizations have demonstrated that 
lengthy training and official credentials of professional service givers are less 
necessary, and that a shared background with clients is more necessary than 
conventionally acknowledged. Many of the programs train their own staff so 
that even the most mystified of skills—such as simple medical procedures—can be 
provided by medics or practitioners working under the supervision of profes­
sionals.
Within official city services there are already examples of positions created 
in which community people without lengthy training provide routine services 
that ordinarily are in the domain of professionals. Several administrators in the 
Berkeley Health Department, for example, have hired nurse practitioners, 
community health workers and non-nurse examiners.
Embracing non-professionals not only allows for greater similarity between 
providers and clients, but also allows for clients to become providers. Job ladders 
can be developed that allow older community people to become practitioners 
where expense and other considerations might have precluded professional train­
ing earlier in their lives. Services are also more likely to be provided in an atmos­
phere free of professional dogma and ignorance.
2. Decentralized facilities
The scattered locations and control of relatively homogeneous facilities
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seem to have provided environments where people can receive assistance comfort­
ably. The flexibility and responsiveness of the small organizations to changing 
needs have allowed adaptation to community changes as they occur. Integrating 
the community based services into a public program should preserve the highly 
decentralized operation and control that has delivered services with so little 
administrative overhead cost.
3. The activist orientation of services
Unlike many traditional agencies, many of the community service organi­
zations have stressed the link between individual problems and broader social 
pathologies. Beyond providing support for lifestyles that may differ from that 
of the dominant culture, many of the services share the goal of changing the 
social environment rather than encouraging its passive acceptance. For example, 
Bay Area Women Against Rape, an organization funded for several years by the 
city, has pressured police departments throughout the Bay Area to change their 
procedures in dealing with rape victims. BA WAR’S program included vigorous 
complaints about insensitive police treatment, as well as counselling and support 
for the women.
D. Wage Parity
The prospects of progressive control of the council, and public institu­
tionalization of the alternative social services, would signal an end to the subsi­
dizing of the programs by staff members. No longer would the director and staff 
of city clinics receive high professional salaries while the director and staff of the 
Women’s Health Collective remain virtually unpaid. A single set of standards that 
also would bring highest and lowest paid job categories closer together would 
govern both clinics.
Coalition commitment to equal pay for equal work can be implemented, 
once the council reconnects services to equitably derived sources of income. Social 
services are a single aspect of a comprehensive city redistributive program.
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X. CONCLUSION
The programs we have discussed are directed towards increasing com­
munity control over the local economy and rectifying existing disparities be­
tween the city’s wealthy and poor people. To be sure, Berkeley or any other city 
is not sufficiently strong or autonomous to overcome all the inequities that 
result from public and private decisions made at the global, national, state or 
even regional levels. The proposals included here speak to that reality. They try 
to answer the more limited question of how existing local powers might be used 
for redistributive impact.
Since the founding of a progressive electoral coalition in Berkeley ten 
years ago, the group’s economic program has focused consistently on the basics 
t>f community survival. Housing, land use, utility ownership, employment, tax 
policies, and control of capital are all issues that clearly separate the interests of 
poor and working people from the interests of the wealthy. Each involves 
institutions that are open to democratic community control. And most impor­
tantly, these issues provide opportunities for major structural changes in the 
local economy.
Few in the Coalition would view the goals of past campaigns—rent control, 
neighborhood preservation, community control of police, or public ownership of 
the utility system-as “solutions” to fundamental problems in the national 
economy. But while there is no magic in specific reforms, carefully chosen 
programs can pry larger and larger cracks in the system. These local reform 
measures help meet the needs of poor and working people, and at the same time 
point the way to still better ways of distributing wealth and power.
Few of these basic structural changes, however, are imminent in Berkeley. 
The progressive coalition in the city no longer has any illusions about easy vic­
tories.
Successful initiative campaigns, such as rent control and campaign spend­
ing limitations, were immediately challenged in the courts and at least partially 
undermined. The corporate liberals on the city council sabotaged other initia­
tives passed by the voters, refusing to publicize and control police mutual aid 
agreements, for instance. The city attorney, appointed by the city manager, also 
refuses to pursue obvious legal violations—such as the failure of the cable televi­
sion operator to pay the franchise fee or meet contract requirements—that might 
offend the business community.
The biennial city elections themselves have become guessing games for 
many voters, as all contenders masquerade in “progressive” garb while corporate 
money finances intentionally confusing media campaigns. The corporate liberal 
slates attempt to look and sound like Coalition candidates until the votes are
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counted. The deliberately engendered voter frustration that results is a mark of 
the cynical tactics now being used by business and professional interests to avoid 
significant changes in the city.
But there have also been significant Coalition successes in recent years. 
The rent control and neighborhood preservation ordinances helped to halt the 
construction of speculative apartment complexes threatening the basically sound 
and attractive housing in the city. The Police Review Commission has prevented 
the Berkeley Police Department from developing a number of paramilitary 
programs, and continues to oversee its operation. Pressure from Coalition coun- 
cilmembers helped secure city funding for non-departmental social service pro­
grams. Newly elected city auditor Florence McDonald has instituted a number of 
job structure changes within her department that could significantly affect the 
city bureaucracy. The Fair Representation Ordinance assures Coalition voices on 
virtually all city boards and commissions.
Still, the defeats have had their effect. The Coalition itself has changed 
over the past six years. The high-blown rhetoric of the first platform in 1969 has 
largely been discarded for simple descriptions of local concerns. Many of the 
impossible dreams and easy solutions have been shaken out, leaving a program 
that is both direct in its redistributional intent and practical.
The Coalition is also more realistic about differences among its members. 
Third World representatives, women and students are now guaranteed power 
within the organization. For the first time the Coalition has successfully main­
tained itself in the period between elections and has begun to make working 
alliances with a broad range of community organizations.
The Coalition is growing up politically. After six years, it has realized that 
a set of programs and a slate of candidates is not sufficient to gain power in the 
city. Winning the necessary votes in April means organizing outside the tradi­
tional student and flatland strongholds of Coalition support.
Because of life-style, race and class-differences in the city, that organizing 
is very difficult. But the present left Coalition is committed to the task, driven 
by a common desire to redistribute wealth and privilege symbolized by the large 
hill residences clearly visible from the Berkeley flatlands. Economic redistribu­
tion will become a political necessity in the city, as in the larger economy, as the 
majority of people decide that their needs can and should be met.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Campaign Reform Act 6.4.1974  
^Utility User’s Tax Repeal 4.6.1971  
5 Marijuana Initiative 4.17.1973  
4 Initiative Reform 6.4.1974  
5 Charter Review Committee 6.4.1974  
^Powers of the Cty. Mgr. 4.15.1975  
1 Savo Is. Double Green Lgt.
®Fair Rep. Ordinance 4.15.1975  
 ^Comm. Control o f Police 4.6.1971  
10PRC Initiative 4.17.1973
11 Mutual Aid Pacts 4.17.1973  
12Police Weapons 4.17.1973  
^ P o lice  Residency Req. 4.17.1973  
14 Rent Control Ord. 6.2.1972
Neighborhood Pres. Ord. 4.17.1973  
I® 1st Public Power Init. 4.17.1973  
112nd Public Power Init. 11.5.1974 
^Progressive Income Tax 
1® Sports Events Tax (’74) 
l (ljo b  Restructuring (’71)




The Cities’ Wealth has been compiled and edited by the Community 
Ownership Organizing Project, and designed by Diane Coleman.
Staff for The Cities’ Wealth project:
Eve Bach is a city planner, an economic analyst for Coalition-elected 
officials, and has served on the BCA Steering Committee.
Thomas Brom is a journalist who has written extensively about public 
utilities, produced local radio programs, and has been active in the fight for com­
munity control of cable television.
Julia Estrella works as the Administrative Assistant for Councilmember 
Ying Lee Kelley and is an active member of Berkeley’s Asian political caucus.
Lenny Goldberg is an economist, teacher, Coalition candidate for city 
council in 1973, and member of the Parks and Recreation Commission.
Ed Kirshner is an urban economist and city planner and the coordinator 
of the Community Ownership Organizing Project.
The staff of councilmembers Loni Hancock, Ying Lee Kelley, and John 
Denton provided much of the documentation on city elections, initiative cam­
paigns, and council action. Back issues of Grassroots, a Berkeley community 
newspaper, helped us reconstruct political battles. Gail Bourke, Marcus Wilcher, 
Tony Leong, Roberto Martinez, and Salvador Murillo helped draft the social 
service chapter. Finally, we would like to thank Ken Baar, Gale Bach, Fran 
Benveniste, Larry Duga, Sandy Martin, David Mundstock, Andy Sun, Lee Webb 





The National Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies 
was founded in Madison, Wisconsin, June 1975. It is a major meeting place and 
forum for elected and appointed officials, community organizations, political 
activists and technically trained experts interested in alternative politics and 
programs at the state and local level. Discussions and workshops within the 
National Conference include questions of political strategy. However, concentra­
tion is on the specific nuts and bolts of programmatic alternatives. Subjects con­
sidered include land use, tax reform, consumer protection, agricultural policy, 
minority employment, public power, community and state-owned enterprises, 
control of natural resources, women’s issues, public employees, and many others.
The National Conference has its headquarters in Washington D.C., at the 
Institute for Policy Studies. Besides holding regional and topical conferences, 
and an annual national conference in June, the national office maintains a 
Clearing House of Alternative Legislation. The National Conference publishes a 
quarterly newsletter, an Alternative Legislation Series,and a Public Policy Pamph­
let Series. A Public Policy Reader is prepared for the annual national conference 
and is also available from the national office. Finally, the national office coordi­
nates a series of task forces composed of local officials, planners and informed 
citizens who are drafting model legislation.
The National Conference was organized to be of service to state and local 
public officials, as well as others who are interested in alternative programs. 
Your communications can be of great help in furthering the work and extending 
the influence of the Conference. Please send information, new names, and 
suggestions to:
Barbara Bick, National Coordinator 
Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies 
1901 Q Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20009
PUBLICATIO NS LIST
CONFERENCE ON ALTERNATIVE STATE AND LOCAL 
PUBLIC POLICIES
ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATION SERIES. Model bills on □  Cooperative Banks,
□  Utility Regulation, □  Energy, □  Health, □  “Lifeline” Utility Rates, and
□  Auto Insurance Corporations. Price: 50^ each. Please enter number of copies 
desired in the appropriate boxes.
PUBLIC POLICY READER, Second Edition. A compilation of the best and 
most innovative bills, ordinances, and proposals of the past year. Over 600 pages. 
Price: $7.50 each, $15.00 to institutions.
LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK ON WOMEN’S ISSUES, by Kathy Rhodes. A 
collection of legislation on economic issues affecting women, including the best, 
most innovative proposals, and a detailed bibliography. Price: $2.50 each, $5.00 
to institutions.
THE CITIES’ WEALTH: Programs for Community Economic Control in Berke­
ley, California, compiled by the Community Ownership Organizing Project. This 
report outlines in detail the programs and organizing strategies of the Berkeley 
Coalition over the seven years of its political work with the Berkeley City 
Council. Price: $2.50 each, $5.00 to institutions.
THE AUSTIN CONFERENCE REPORT. Proceedings of the Second Annual 
Conference on Alternative State and Public Policies. Contains summaries and 
highlights of the conference which was attended by elective and appointive 
progressive public officials from around the country. Price: $2.50 each, $5.00 to 
institutions.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF PUBLIC MONEY: Should States and Cities Have Their
Own Banks?, by Derek Shearer. Analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of 
state and city-owned banks. Includes descriptions of the state-owned Bank of 
North Dakota, and recently proposed state banks in New York, Washington, 
Oregon and California. Price: $1.50 each, $3.00 to institutions.
THE MANITOBA AUTO INSURANCE PLAN, by Sherman Bernard. A report 
on the operation, costs, and social and economic considerations of providing 
auto insurance through a public corporation. Price $1.00 each, $2.00 to 
institutions.
CONFERENCE NEWSLETTER. The Newsletter reports activities of the Confer­
ence on Alternative State and Local Public Policies, plus information about 
recent federal, state, and local alternative and model legislation. Published 






Controlling a City’s Wealth: The Lessons o f  New Town Development, Edward 
Kirshner and James Morey, spring 1973, reprint from Working Papers free
Community Ownership in Old Towns and New Cities, Edward Kirshner and 
James Morey, 1975, 75 pages; available from the Center for Community 
Economic Development, 639 Massachusetts St., suite 316, Cambridge, 
Mass., 02139 $3.50
RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
Newsletter, National Land for People, Fresno, California free
A Rural New Town for the West Side o f  the San Joaquin Valley, Edward 
Kirshner, Kenneth Baar, Thomas Brom, July 1975,80 pages $3.00
PUBLIC POWER:
A n Energy Policy for California, Peter Barnes $ 1.00
How They Homswoggled Berkeley, Joseph Petulla, reprint from the Nation free
The Solar Derby, Peter Barnes, reprint from The New Republic, Feb. 1975 free
The Politics o f  Public Power, Thomas Brom and Edward Kirshner, Feb. 1974, 39 
pages $2.00
Buying Power: Community Owned Electric Systems, Thomas Brom and Edward 
Kirshner, reprint from Ramparts, summer 1974 free
Edison vs. Public Power: The Squeeze in California, Thomas Brom, reprint from 
the Nation, March 1974 free
COOPERATIVE HOUSING:
Lamenting the Rent, Peter Barnes, reprint from The New Republiç free
Low-to-Moderate Income Housing: A Proposal for Local Communities, Edward 
Kirshner and Eve Bach, revised ed. Oct. 1975,69 pages $2.50
Savo Island Financial Feasibility Study, Chester McGuire and Edward Kirshner, 
Feb. 1975,40 pages $2.00
Cable TV: Money to the People, Thomas Brom, reprint from Working Papers
free
The Bell System and Community Telephones, Thomas Brom and Edward 
Kirshner, May 1974,43 pages $ 1.50
COMMUNICATIONS:
Community Television, Thomas Brom and Edward Kirshner, September 1973, 
57 pages $1.50
PENSION FUNDS:
Public Pension Funds as a Source o f  Capital for Job Creation, Edward Kirshner, 
Kenneth Baar, and Eve Bach, prepared for California Department of 
Employment Development, July 1975, 34 pages $2.00
COOP NEWSLETTER:
The Public Works, Thomas Brom, editor free
“THE CITIES’ WEALTH is a brilliant exposition of 
the political programs developed in Berkeley, 
California, by a radical coalition of activists. The 
programs are concrete, policy-oriented, and 
grounded in experience. They are based on the 
premise that the legitimate powers of the city — to 
tax, own property, borrow capital at reduced rates, 
and own productive enterprises — can be made to 
serve the needs of the majority of community 
residents.”
Lee Webb 
Institute for Policy Studies
